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DESIGN FLAWS IN THE BANKRUPTCY REGIME:
LESSONS FROM THE U.K. FOR PREVENTING A
RESURGENT CREDITORS’ RACE IN THE U.S.
Jodie A. Kirshner*

A current trend in U.S. bankruptcy law reflects the predictions of
economic theory related to “common pool” resources. According to the
theory, without coordinating law to account for and distribute limited assets
in an orderly way, creditors race to claim the assets for themselves. The
winners of the race deprive other creditors of value and make the
rehabilitation of economically viable companies more difficult, a situation
that economists would describe as a “tragedy of the commons.”
Increasingly, secured creditors divert bankrupt companies from the
traditional Chapter 11 process, which has protected the interests of junior
creditors, and push them instead into asset sales under Section 363 of the
U.S. Bankruptcy Code. Secured creditors use Section 363 to maximize
their recoveries to the detriment of unsecured creditors and the broader
goals of the traditional bankruptcy process.
That a similar trend persists in the UK, despite concerted legislative
efforts to reverse secured creditor control, indicates the pressures on
bankruptcy law to withstand the tendency towards a creditors’ race. It has
become necessary to retool the bankruptcy regime to better withstand
secured creditor circumvention. The English experience suggests that
empowering a neutral regulator that can use soft law to influence the
incentives of secured creditors may provide a solution.

* The author is grateful to Columbia Law School Alfred McCormack Professor Robert Scott
and the Columbia Law School Center for Contract and Economic Organization for hosting
her while on sabbatical from Cambridge University completing this article. She also thanks
participants in the Brooklyn Law School Center for the Study of Business Law and
Regulation Workshop for helpful comments, and Stephanie Betts and William Gane at
Bureau van Dijk for providing access to administrators’ progress reports from the FAME
database.

527

KIRSHNER_FINAL (ARTICLE 4).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

528

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

3/26/2015 3:50 PM

[Vol. 17:2

INTRODUCTION ..........................................................................................528
I. ECONOMIC THEORY ..............................................................................531
II. AMERICAN REALITY .............................................................................534
A. Secured Creditor Control ........................................................535
B. Control to Force Asset Sales ...................................................538
C. Chrysler ...................................................................................541
III. BENEFIT/COST ANALYSIS .....................................................................545
A. Speed and Expense ..................................................................545
1. Expense of Chapter 11 .......................................................545
2. Speed of Sales Reduces Costs ...........................................547
B. Cost to Unsecured Creditors ...................................................550
IV. UK REALITY ........................................................................................553
A. Receivership to Administration ...............................................554
B. New Administration .................................................................558
C. Resurgent Secured Creditor Race ...........................................561
V. RETOOLING ...........................................................................................566
A. English Example ......................................................................567
B. Impartial Regulator .................................................................569
CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................570

INTRODUCTION
Bankruptcy law forces individual creditors into collective procedures
that take the place of a race for assets, in order to maximize overall
recoveries and provide the opportunity for corporate rescue. 1 In the United
States, however, secured creditors increasingly circumvent the cooperative
process. 2
Bankrupt companies with little to offer in exchange for new credit
have grown dependent on existing secured creditors. 3 When the creditors
have provided new financing, they have imposed covenants granting them

1. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 95-595 at 340 (1977) (“Bankruptcy is designed to provide
an orderly liquidation procedure under which all creditors are treated equally. A race of
diligence by creditors for the debtor’s assets prevents that.”) See also Elizabeth Warren,
Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 789 (1987) (describing the “deliberately created
chance” for rehabilitation in bankruptcy).
2. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird, The New Face of Chapter 11, 12 AM. BANKR. INST. L.
REV. 69, 73-74 (2004) (listing examples of bankrupt companies whose creditors ensured
that the companies’ assets would be sold to the highest bidder).
3. See, e.g., Harvey R. Miller & Shai Y. Waisman, Is Chapter 11 Bankrupt?, 47 B.C.
L. REV. 129, 154 (2005) (“Because debtors that file for Chapter 11 protection increasingly
have balance sheets that are encumbered by large amounts of secured debt . . . negotiations
over DIP loan agreements have become more and more one sided . . . .”).
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effective control of the bankruptcy. 4 They have used their position to cash
out their claims in a sale of assets under Section 363 of the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code, rather than support the company through a conventional
Chapter 11 process. 5 This has decreased recoveries for other creditors and
eliminated possibilities for rehabilitating viable companies.6
That a parallel trend has developed in the United Kingdom indicates
the pressures bankruptcy law faces in preventing secured creditors from
reintroducing the creditors’ race.7 The United Kingdom actively reformed
its procedures to reduce secured creditor control, yet secured creditors
increasingly evade the new requirements by negotiating in advance with
companies. 8
In order to maximize and more fairly allocate asset recoveries, it has
become necessary to devise new ways to align the incentives of secured
creditors with the traditional collective bankruptcy process. This article
draws on the English experience to inform developments in the United
States. 9
Section I anchors the issues at stake in economic theory related to
“common pool” resources and the narrative of the “tragedy of the

4. See, e.g., id. (“Such leverage has enabled DIP lenders to impose increasingly
severe covenants and conditions on the debtor and its activities to the point that control of
the Chapter 11 case has been taken away from the bankruptcy court.”)
5. See Boris I. Mankovetskiy, Creditor Issues in Chapter 11 Filings, in CREDITOR’S
RIGHTS IN CHAPTER 11 CASES 1 (2013) (finding that there are fewer Chapter 11 filings and
those that are filed, are “quick sales of the debtor’s assets under Section 363 of the
Bankruptcy Code” rather than traditional Chapter 11 filings).
6. Cf. Stephanie Ben-Ishai & Stephen J. Lubben, Sales or Plans: A Comparative
Account of the “New” Corporate Reorganization, 56 MCGILL L.J. 591, 598 (2011) (“There
are concerns about the propriety of turning the bankruptcy court and Chapter 11 into a
glorified foreclosure process, particularly if the cost of that process is not borne by secured
lenders. Moreover, some recent studies suggest that secured lenders may be driven to
embrace quick sales for reasons that have nothing to do with maximizing asset values.”)
See also Thomas Jackson & Robert Scott, On the Nature of Bankruptcy: An Essay on
Bankruptcy Sharing and the Creditors’ Bargain, 75 VA. L. REV. 155, 159-160 (1989)
(“Going concern value does not exceed liquidation value in all cases, however. The
assumption of greater going concern value-depends upon the existence of two factors: the
debtor’s assets must be worth more in combination than if they were broken up and sold,
and the long-term prospects of the debtor must be brighter than the short-term prospects. In
cases where either of these factors does not hold, total group welfare would be enhanced by
a prompt liquidation . . . .”).
7. See infra Section IV.C.
8. See generally John Tribe, Company Voluntary Arrangements and Rescue: A New
Hope and a Tudor Orthodoxy, 5 J. BUS. L. 454 (2009) (discussing recent changes in
bankruptcy law in the United Kingdom with a particular emphasis on the utilitarian
approach that seeks to maximize creditor value); See also infra Section IV.C.
9. See infra Sections IV, V.
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commons.” 10 Bankrupt companies with limited assets present a classic
“common pool” problem, making strong bankruptcy law necessary to avoid
a “tragedy of the commons” and instead facilitate normative objectives that
include the equitable distribution of assets and the survival of distressed
companies where appropriate. 11
Section II traces developments in the United States and explains how
and why secured creditors have reasserted control in bankruptcy and used it
to avoid conventional reorganization procedures. 12 The creditors have used
financing arrangements as a means for forcing companies into Section 363
asset sales, where they recover more and other creditors recover less.13 The
Section presents the Section 363 asset sale of Chrysler to illustrate more
specifically the benefits and pitfalls of the trend.14
Section III examines more closely the tradeoffs between conventional
corporate reorganization under Chapter 11 and market-based alternatives
that lack protections for less powerful creditors.15 Section 363 asset sales
speed the bankruptcy process, reducing professional fees, but the sales
often take place at an undervalue and reduce overall creditor returns.16
Section IV presents a comparison of the United States trend with
developments in the United Kingdom. 17 English bankruptcy law would
appear to offer a compromise position of a faster, more market-based
process that retains protections for junior creditors.18 England has
deliberately sought to reduce control by secured creditors and increase
participation by creditors of all types.19 Nevertheless, secured creditors in
the United Kingdom have undermined the new procedures and reasserted
their dominance. 20
The fact that secured creditors in both systems have reverted to a race
for assets evidences significant obstacles to achieving the collective goals
of bankruptcy law. 21 Section V queries how to reinstate secured creditors
into the cooperative process that bankruptcy law has intended to provide. 22
The Section draws on the English experience and concludes by advocating
for the establishment of an impartial regulator that can use soft law to
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

See infra Section I.
Id.
See infra Section II.A, B.
Id.
See infra Section II.C.
See infra Section III.
See infra Section III.A, B.
See infra Section IV.
See infra Section IV.A, B.
Id.
See infra Section IV.C.
See infra Sections I, II.B, III.B, IV.C.
See infra Section V.
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influence secured creditors to fund and participate in reorganization once
again. 23
I.

ECONOMIC THEORY

A classic account of bankruptcy law derives from economic theory
related to “common pool” resources and the narrative of the “tragedy of the
commons.” 24 The term “common pool” refers to a collectively-managed
natural resource, marked by scarcity, such as a fishery. 25 It serves the
individual interests of those with access to the fishery to quickly
appropriate as many fish for themselves as possible, even though society
might fare better under a managed system in which fishing is limited to
preserve a stock for the future. 26 Without centralized supervision, a
“tragedy of the commons” occurs: the individuals overexploit the shared
resource and frequently destroy it.27 The example of the fishery illustrates
how the preservation of a “common pool” for the benefit of all necessitates
coordinated decision-making and control. 28 Otherwise, individuals will
pursue their own self-interest and decrease overall value. 29
23. Id.
24. D. BAIRD & T. JACKSON, CASES, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON BANKRUPTCY, 2030 (2d ed. 1990); THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 10-13
(1986) (describing bankruptcy law as a solution for a common pool problem in which
individuals race to extract resources); Susan Block-Lieb, Congress’s Temptation to Defect:
A Political and Economic Theory of Legislative Resolutions to Financial Common Pool
Problems, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 801, 802-803 (1997) (same); Jackson & Scott, supra note 6, at
178 (1989) (same).
25. See Sara R. Curran & Tundi Agardy, Common Property Systems, Migration, and
Coastal Ecosystems, 31 AMBIO: A J. OF THE HUMAN ENVIRONMENT 303, 304 (2002)
(discussing the common pool problem in the context of environmental resources).
26. See Simon Deakin, The Corporation as Commons: Rethinking Property Rights,
Governance and Sustainability in the Business Enterprise, 37 QUEEN’S L.J. 339, 368 (2012)
(applying the concept of the common pool to corporations which have various “owners”
who could potentially conflict if each owner sought to maximize his or her own self
interest); H. Scott Gordon, The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The
Fishery, 62 J. POL. ECON. 124, 135 (1954) (discussing the common property problem as a
situation in which each person acting in his or her own self-interest ultimately depletes the
common resources making everyone’s situation worse); Agasha Mugasha, Solutions for
Developing-Country External Debt: Insolvency of Forgiveness, 13 L. & BUS. REV. OF THE
AMERICAS 859, 874 n.66 (2007) (applying the concept of the common pool to creditors).
27. See, e.g., Deakin, supra note 26 (discussing the role of the legal system to maintain
the business enterprise as a “commons”); Steven L. Schwarcz & Iman Anabtawi, Regulating
Systemic Risk: Towards an Analytical Framework, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1349, 1402
(2011) (stating that the supervisory process operates to protect the financial system because
the “overexploitation of shared resources occurs in advance of its impact on individual
group members.”).
28. See, e.g., Irit Mevorach, Towards a Consensus on the Treatment of Multinational
Enterprise Groups in Insolvency, 18 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 359, 393 (2010)
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A bankrupt company can be viewed as presenting a “common pool”
problem. 30 Similar to the fish in a fishery, the assets of the company are
subject to conflicting creditor claims because the company has undertaken
too much debt. 31 Individual creditors have incentives to enforce their
claims against the company before the assets to pay them run out. 32
Without coordinating law, inefficient outcomes equivalent to the
“tragedy of the commons” result. 33 Theorists assume that creditors will
race to claim assets more quickly than others. 34 Dissipation of the assets, in
turn, decreases the utility of the creditors as a group. 35 When creditors
dismantle the assets of companies in a piecemeal way, they often destroy
the “going concern” value of firms. 36 “Going concern” value represents the
value of intact companies that can continue in their businesses without
interruption. 37 As companies break apart and the value is lost, all of the
stakeholders dependent on them become less well off.38
(discussing the benefits of a coordinated process in resolving the “common pool” problem
that arrives in multinational corporate group bankruptcy).
29. See generally Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1243
(1968) (describing the principle of the common pool).
30. See JACKSON supra, note 24, at 10-11 (noting that the role of bankruptcy to solve
“a common pool problem” is “largely unquestioned”).
31. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Anthony J. Casey, Bankruptcy Step Zero, 2012 SUP.
CT. REV. 203, 206 (describing the facts of the RadLAX case, in which a company borrowed
heavily and had insufficient assets remaining to meet the claims of its creditors in full).
32. See, e.g., Kenneth Ayotte & David A. Skeel Jr., Bankruptcy Law as a Liquidity
Provider, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1557, 1564 (2013) (describing pressure under state law “first in
time, first in right” regimes for creditors to act quickly to secure that they are paid in full,
even though this behavior may lead to the long-term detriment of the collective interests of
all creditors).
33. Bryan G. Faubus, Narrowing The Bankruptcy Safe Harbor For Derivatives To
Combat Systemic Risk, 59 DUKE L.J. 801, 826 (2010); David L. Perechocky, Should Ad Hoc
Committees Have Fiduciary Duties?: Judicial Regulation of the Bankruptcy Market, 86
AM. BANKR. L.J. 527, 528 (2012).
34. See, e.g., Kara J. Bruce, Rehabilitating Bankruptcy Reform, 13 NEV. L.J. 174, 175
n.2 (2012) (“[C]reditors, left to their own devices, would pursue self-interested actions that
would deplete the common pool of funds available to the wider creditor body.”).
35. See Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 32, at 1573-574 (“A creditor that chooses to pursue
its individual, state law collection rights may be causing the premature liquidation of a
viable firm, and this may hurt all creditors.”).
36. See JACKSON, supra note 24, at 14-17.
37. Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 9 (1949).
38. See Timothy W. Hoffmann & Laura L. Swanson, Nonmonetary Defaults in
Executory Contracts: A Potential Hurdle to a Successful Restructuring, in NORTON ANN.
SURV. BANKR. L. 219 (2013) (“One of Chapter 11’s fundamental objectives is to provide a
framework that allows financially distressed companies to maintain their going concern
value for the benefit of all stakeholders.”); Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Control of Wealth
in Bankruptcy, 82 TEX. L. REV. 795, 844 (2004) (“[S]ecured lenders . . . [may] want to
liquidate a debtor quickly to maximize the value of their security interests, even if delayed
liquidation or reorganization might be in the best interests of other stakeholders.”) (citation
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Bankruptcy law can, in theory, force creditors to join an orderly
process to account for and distribute limited assets.39 It can provide a
mechanism for settling at once the overlapping obligations of companies,
so that creditors do not try to grab assets before others can claim them. 40
Law professor Thomas Jackson described it as a tool for constraining
individual creditor actions to increase collective utility as follows:
The grab rules of nonbankruptcy law and their allocation of assets
on the basis of first-come, first-served create an incentive on the
part of the individual creditors, when they sense that a debtor may
have more liabilities than assets, to get in line today (by, for
example, getting a sheriff to execute on the debtor’s equipment),
because if they do not, they run the risk of getting nothing. This
decision by numerous individual creditors, however, may be the
wrong decision for the creditors as a group. Even though the
debtor is insolvent, they might be better off if they held the assets
together. Bankruptcy provides a way to make these diverse
individuals act as one, by imposing a collective and compulsory
proceeding on them. 41

omitted). Some scholars do not think that bankruptcy law should only be concerned with
efficiency for creditors. See, e.g., Karen Gross, Taking Community Interests into Account in
Bankruptcy: An Essay, 72 WASH. U. L. Q. 1031, 1031 (1994) (“[C]ommunity interests must
be taken into account in both the corporate and personal bankruptcy systems.”); Donald R.
Korobkin, Employee Interests in Bankruptcy, 4 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5 (1996)
(examining the interests of employees in bankruptcy proceedings); Elizabeth Warren,
Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 777 (1987) (“Bankruptcy encompasses a number
of competing––and sometimes conflicting––values . . . . [N]o one value [ought to]
dominate[], so that bankruptcy policy becomes a composite of factors that bear on a better
answer to the question, ‘How shall the losses be distributed?’”). But see Douglas G. Baird,
Loss Distribution, Forum Shopping, and Bankruptcy: A Reply to Warren, 54 U. CHI. L.
REV. 815, 822 (1987) (arguing that the “legal rule to distribute losses in bankruptcy” should
be equivalent to the “legal rule that distributes the same loss outside of bankruptcy”); Hon.
Barry S. Schermer, Response to Professor Gross: Taking the Interests of the Community
Into Account in Bankruptcy—A Modern Day Tale of Belling the Cat, 72 WASH. U. L. Q.
1049 (1994) (noting that the community interest argument is “certain to fail in [its]
application because [it] does not consider present realities.”).
39. See Christopher W. Frost, Another Look at Arbitration in Bankruptcy, BANKR. L.
LETTER (Thomson Reuters), January 2013, at ¶ 5 available at 33 No. 1 Bankruptcy Law
Letter 1 (examining “arbitration focusing on two recent decisions from the Ninth Circuit in
which the courts denied a creditor’s motion to compel arbitration”).
40. DAVID G. EPSTEIN ET AL., BANKRUPTCY 1-3 (1993); Craig H. Averch & Michael J.
Collins, Avoidance of Foreclosure Sales As Preferential Transfers: Another Serious Threat
to Secured Creditors?, 24 TEX. TECH L. REV. 985, 1037 (1993) (“In essence, bankruptcy is a
collective proceeding designed to eliminate, or at least reduce, the inequities of
nonbankruptcy “grab” law.”).
41. JACKSON, supra note 24, at 12-13.

KIRSHNER_FINAL (ARTICLE 4).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

534

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

3/26/2015 3:50 PM

[Vol. 17:2

Bankruptcy law thus can solve the “common pool” problem that results
from the shortfall of assets to meet the claims of every creditor in full. 42
Specifically, Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code and
Administration, as set out in the English Insolvency Act 1986, prevent the
creditors’ race for assets by imposing a moratorium against individual
creditor actions. 43 The suspension of creditor actions allows companies
“breathing space” in which to negotiate a comprehensive plan of
reorganization. 44 The American and English statutory frameworks both
require distributions of assets to accord with existing creditor hierarchies
and to treat creditors within the same priority class equally. 45 The
American and English procedures, therefore, seek to maximize overall,
rather than individual, value by protecting corporate assets from unilateral
creditor actions. 46
II.

AMERICAN REALITY

In actual practice, secured creditors in the U.S. increasingly
circumvent the collective provisions legislated in Chapter 11. 47 Secured
creditors offer the only source of post-petition financing to bankrupt
companies. 48 Without further bargaining power, the companies agree to
grant them rights that facilitate asset sales under Section 363 of the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code. 49 The sales take the place of traditional reorganizations

42. Id. at 10-11.
43. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2012); H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 340 (1977); Bruce Leonard,
The International Year in Review, in NORTON ANN. SURV. BANKR. L. 15 (2002)
44. See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Private Debt and the Missing Lever
of Corporate Governance, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1209, 1238 (2006) (“Chapter 11 is supposed
to provide ‘breathing space’ to a struggling business from the collection efforts of its
creditors.”).
45. In the U.S., this is referred to as the “absolute priority rule.” The English
equivalent is found in Insolvency Act, 1986, c. 45, §§ 40, 175 (Eng.).
46. See supra notes 43-44.
47. See, e.g., Yaad Rotem & Omer Dekel, The Bankruptcy Auction as a Game ––
Designing an Optimal Auction in Bankruptcy, 32 REV. LITIG. 330, 331 (2013) (“[A] sale
under Section 363(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, which states that ‘[t]he trustee, after notice
and hearing, may use, sell, or lease, other than in the ordinary course of business, property
of the estate’ . . . is allowed not only for trustees in Chapter 7 liquidations, but also as an
out-of-plan maneuver for debtors-in-possession . . . during a Chapter 11 proceeding. In the
Chapter 11 context, Section 363(b) presents an anomaly, as it bypasses rather easily the
classic and carefully designed Chapter 11 structure of the negotiation-plan-confirmation.”)
(internal citation omitted).
48. See, e.g., Kenneth Klee & Richard Levin, Rethinking Chapter 11, 21 J. BANKR. L.
& PRAC. 465, 472-73 (2012).
49. See Ben-Ishai & Lubben, supra note 6, at 623 (finding that “secured lenders can
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and enable secured creditors to recreate and dominate a resurgent race for
assets. 50 They use the bankruptcy process as a sales forum to maximize
their own recoveries, to the detriment of other creditors. 51
The high-profile Section 363 asset sale of Chrysler to Fiat in 2009
reflected the trend. 52 While in the 1980s, of the ten largest companies that
reorganized, nine reorganized successfully in Chapter 11, by 2002, less
than a quarter of companies did. 53 In 2009, thirty-four percent of cases
proceeded through a sale of assets under Section 363. 54 In recent years,
secured creditors have forced companies including Lehman Brothers,
Washington Mutual, TWA, Ritz Camera, Eddie Bauer, Blockbuster, and
Borders into asset sales, rather than conventional reorganizations.55
A. Secured Creditor Control
Secured lenders have incentives to eschew the managed Chapter 11
bankruptcy process and reinstate the creditors’ race. 56 They fare better by
selling corporate assets quickly to recoup the value of their collateral,
regardless of whether a company could continue in its business intact. 57
create an emergency at will simply by freezing the debtor’s access to the case needed for
daily operations. . . . to set a timetable for the bankruptcy case that will preclude any other
option than a quick sale.”).
50. See Gerard McCormack, Control and Corporate Rescue –– An Anglo-American
Evaluation, 56 INT’L COMP. L. QUART. 515, 532 (2007) (“Chapter 11 no longer functions
like an anti-takeover device for managers; it has become, instead, the most important new
frontier for corporate control, complete with asset sales and faster cases.”) (quoting David
A. Skeel, Jr., Creditors’ Ball: The “New” Corporate Governance in Chapter 11, 152 U. PA.
L. REV. 917, 918 (2003)).
51. Melissa B. Jacoby, Fast, Cheap, and Creditor-Controlled: Is Corporate
Reorganization Failing?, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 401, 414, 430-31 (2006); George W. Kuney,
Misinterpreting Bankruptcy Code Section 363(f) and Undermining the Chapter 11 Process,
76 AM. BANKR. L. J. 235 (2002).
52. Ben-Ishai & Lubben, supra note 6, at 593.
53. Baird, supra note 2, at 80-81.
54. Andrew A. Wood, The Decline of Unsecured Creditor and Shareholder Recoveries
in Large Public Company Bankruptcies, 85 AM. BANKR. L.J. 429, 442 (2011).
55. In re Trans World Airlines, Inc., 322 F.3d 283, 288-90, 293 (3d Cir. 2003);
Stephen D. Lerner, Bankruptcy and Financial Restructuring Law 2013: Recent Bankruptcy
and Financial Restructuring Law, ASPATORE (THOMSON REUTERS), at *2 (2013), available
at 2013 WL 574481.
56. See Eyal Z. Geva, The Trajectory of Labor Relations Under Chapter 11, 10
DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 347, 378 (2012) (“The transformation of Chapter 11 into a
foreclosure mechanism through § 363 is attributed to the emergence of secured creditordriven reorganizations, rather than just to the attractiveness of this possibility to the [debtorin-possession].”).
57. See Lynn M. LoPucki & Joseph W. Doherty, Bankruptcy Fire Sales, 106 MICH. L.
REV. 1, 36-37 (2007) (“[Debtor-in-possession] lenders make high-interest loans to debtors at
the beginning of the bankruptcy cases and, assuming the recovery is sufficient—as it almost
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Although restructuring often would provide greater returns to all of the
other creditors, preserve jobs for the company’s employees, and sustain
other businesses in the community serving the company, the secured
lenders receive only a marginal benefit.58 Chapter 11 has imposed a
process that furthers the overall interests of creditors, to the detriment of
the individual interests of secured lenders.59
Chapter 11 of the Code has not changed, but broader transformations
in the bankruptcy environment have facilitated the shift towards renewed
secured creditor control.60 Paramount among the changes has been the
increasing amount of secured debt on companies’ books. 61 In 1978, when
Chapter 11 was enacted, companies that filed for bankruptcy had unsecured
assets available to offer as collateral in exchange for additional credit.62
The availability of unencumbered assets reduced the risk of the loans and
induced lenders to fund reorganization.63 In 1999, the median amount of
secured debt in American companies accounted for only twenty-three
percent of total median assets. 64 By 2010, it had risen to forty-one
percent. 65 Increasingly, companies entering bankruptcy do not have any
unsecured assets, and often have extended second, third, and fourth priority
security on their assets. 66
With every asset already pledged as collateral, companies facing
bankruptcy have grown dependent on existing creditors to provide them

always is—are paid in full at the end.”).
58. See Miller & Waisman, supra note 3, at 157 (“Distressed-debt traders, for example,
often consider an extended Chapter 11 process to be undesirable, given that their primary
concern is achieving a quick return on their investments. DIP lenders, which are often senior
secured creditors, also may favor asset sales in Chapter 11, given that they face limited
upside potential but significant down-side risk from an extended Chapter 11 case.”).
59. See Benjamin A. Berringer, “It’s All Just A Little Bit of History Repeating”: An
Examination of the Chrysler and GM Bankruptcies and Their Implications for Future
Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 7 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 361, 378 (2010) (“[S]afeguards create a
lengthy, time-consuming process that can be subject to capture by holdouts who are
unwilling to approve a plan unless their interests are accommodated.”); Miller & Waisman,
supra note 3, at 153 (describing the motivations of financial institutions seeking liquidity
versus distressed debt traders buying claims at substantial discounts).
60. See, e.g., David A. Skeel, Jr., Creditors’ Ball: The “New” New Corporate
Governance in Chapter 11, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 917, 921 (2003) (Finding that “creditors now
exert much more influence over a case than at any time in recent history.”).
61. Geva, supra note 56, at 395-96.
62. Charles J. Tabb, Credit Bidding, Security, and the Obsolescence of Chapter 11,
2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 103, 139-41.
63. Kenneth M. Ayotte & Edward R. Morrison, Creditor Control and Conflict in
Chapter 11, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 511, 523 (2009).
64. Wood, supra note 54, at 430.
65. Id.
66. Klee & Levin, supra note 48, at 466.
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with new money. 67 The Code has included incentives to encourage them to
lend. 68 Pursuant to section 364, existing creditors that offer funding to
companies already in bankruptcy, typically known as debtor-in-possession
creditors (DIP creditors), receive “priming liens” that take priority over
existing security interests in the same collateral. 69
DIP lenders have leveraged their position to gain control of the
bankruptcy process and maximize their individual recoveries.70 They have
included covenants with their loans that have imposed a range of
requirements on companies. 71 The Bankruptcy Code contains few limits on
their demands, and the companies have little ability to deny the creditors.72
Without unencumbered assets to offer as collateral, they have had no
alternative sources of funding and thus little bargaining power with existing
lenders. 73
The secured creditors have, for example, used their position to
demand control over the management of bankrupt companies in exchange
for DIP financing. 74 In the bankruptcy of the telecommunications company
WorldCom, the creditor required the board of the company to hire a new
chief restructuring officer off of a list of three candidates.75 Empirical
studies have found “a 52% likelihood of senior management turnover” in
the wake of a DIP loan. 76
In addition to forcing governance changes, DIP lenders have used loan
covenants to control corporate decision-making and guarantee their
recoveries. They have imposed, for example, restrictions on the time that
companies could spend trying to reorganize. 77 They have also required
67. See Tabb, supra note 62, at 104-05 (“[T]he reality is that senior secured creditors
often have liens on all of the firm’s assets and exercise virtually total control over the
debtor’s access to cash and thus call the shots . . . .”).
68. See Skeel, supra note 60, at 923 (“The magical provision is Section 364, which
authorizes the bankruptcy court to roll out the red carpet for a lender that is willing to make
a new loan to the debtor.”) (citing 11 U.S.C. § 364 (2000)).
69. 11 U.S.C. § 364 (2012).
70. See, e.g., James J. White, Death and Resurrection of Secured Credit, 12 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 139, 165 (2004) (describing the protection against “cramdowns”
which prioritize a plan over a secure creditor’s objection).
71. See, e.g., McCormack, supra note 50, at 547-49 (depicting how financing
companies may require changes in management to obtain more credit).
72. See, e.g., Klee & Levin, supra note 48, at 472-78.
73. White, supra note 70, at 175-76.
74. See, e.g., Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 44, at 1227-28 (“Trip wires are tied to the
performance of the business . . . to ensure that lenders have control over major decisions and
the ability to insist on changes in management when the business encounter reverses.”).
75. Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Chapter 11 at Twilight, 56 STAN. L.
REV. 673, 685 (2003).
76. Miller & Waisman, supra note 3, at 155.
77. E.g., McCormack, supra note 50, at 548 (“[C]ovenants in the loan agreement may
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companies to pay them in full, should the company file for reorganization
without their consent. 78 Other stipulations have forced companies to
liquidate immediately if they failed to post profits at a minimum level by a
particular date.79 The DIP lender to the grocery chain Winn Dixie specified
that it had the right to reclaim the value of its secured collateral at any time
with five days’ notice. 80 These and similar provisions have enabled DIP
lenders to eliminate the “breathing space” Chapter 11 has provided, in
which management could negotiate plans free from collection efforts by
creditors. 81
B. Control to Force Asset Sales
Increasingly, secured creditors have used the control that they have
appropriated through the terms of DIP loans to push bankrupt companies
into asset sales under Section 363 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. 82 In doing
so, they have undermined the cooperative nature of the bankruptcy law and
reintroduced the race for assets among creditors.83 Obstructing the
traditional Chapter 11 process has guaranteed their own recoveries but
decreased returns to other creditors.84

include a time schedule, setting out a date by which the company must confirm a
reorganization plan or else corporate assets will be auctioned off to the highest bidder.”); see
Kimon Korres, Bankrupting Bankruptcy: Circumventing Chapter 11 Protections through
Manipulation of the Business Justification Standard in § 363 Asset Sales, and A Refined
Standard to Safeguard against Abuse, 63 FLA. L. REV. 959, 967 (2011) (“[D]ebtors often
enter into debtor-in-possession financial agreements involving restrictive covenants that
effectively give control to the creditor.”).
78. See Miller & Waisman, supra note 3, at 154 (describing many restrictive methods
lenders use for controlling companies that borrow money, including “consent requirements
that may go so far as to prohibit the filing of a Chapter 11 plan without the prior written
consent of the lenders.”).
79. See, e.g., Ayotte & Morrison, supra note 63, at 514, 525.
80. Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 44, at 1239.
81. Id. at 1238.
82. Note that alternative arguments exist for the prevalence of Section 363 asset sales,
including the ability of new institutional investors to purchase companies, the fungibility of
assets, and incentives in the Bankruptcy Code. See, e.g., Miller & Waisman, supra note 3, at
156 (explaining how the fungibility of assets increases the potential for acquisitions, and
that the bankruptcy code itself encourages asset sales). The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention
and Consumer Protection Act has also made plan confirmation in Chapter 11 more difficult.
Joseph S. Lawder, et al., Helping Creditor Clients Achieve Their Goals in Chapter 11,
ASPATORE (THOMSON REUTERS), at *4 (2013), available at 2013 WL 936391.
83. See, e.g., Matt Miller & Terry Brennan, Creditors in Possession, THE DEAL, Jan.
12, 2004 (describing how borrowers are backed against the wall in their position against
banks).
84. See Westbrook, supra note 38, at 844 (explaining how a “creditor-controlled sale”
gives rise to a potentially socially undesirable result).
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Section 363 states that, “[t]he trustee, after notice and a hearing, may
use, sell, or lease, other than in the ordinary course of business, property of
the estate . . . .” 85 Pursuant to the provision, with only notice and a hearing,
secured creditors can use the control they acquire through DIP loans to sell
assets free and clear of any existing liabilities. 86 While courts must
approve the sales, the legislation does not require the consent from other
creditors necessary in a traditional Chapter 11.87
Secured creditors have included covenants in DIP financing
arrangements that mandate Section 363 asset sales. 88 Credit Suisse First
Boston, for example, required the insolvent car rental company Budget to
complete a sale within 50 days. 89 Budget complied with the terms, but the
strict timetable prevented management from soliciting bids at higher prices
or pursuing alternatives to the sale.90
Secured lenders have pushed for sales to guarantee repayment of their
claims. 91 When they sell the assets for a higher price than the value of their
collateral, they make a full recovery. 92 Studies have indicated that they
have recouped on average ninety-four percent of the amount owed to them
through sales. 93 While sacrificing the guaranteed payment from a sale to
fund reorganization potentially could make others better off, it would not
increase their own returns. 94
The sales gain speed by bypassing the protections on other creditors
that Chapter 11 has provided. 95 Chapter 11 requires disclosures to
85. 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1) (2012).
86. Todd L. Friedman, The Unjustified Business Justification Rule: A Reexamination
of the Lionel Canon in Light of the Bankruptcies of Lehman, Chrysler, and General Motors,
11 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 181, 182 (2010).
87. Id.
88. See, e.g., Klee & Levin, supra note 48, at 473-74 (describing the increased use of
such clauses in loans).
89. See LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 57, at 37 (“discussing an agreement involving
‘terms that would put Budget in default if it failed to have a “definitive agreement” to sell its
business within fifty days of filing.’”).
90. Id.
91. See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, 55 STAN.
L. REV. 751, 780 (2002) (“The secured creditor . . . has the incentive to force an inefficient
sale of its collateral when the proceeds of the sale will pay the creditor in full.”).
92. Ayotte & Morrison, supra note 63, at 528.
93. This figure pertains to companies with assets worth more than $5 million. Douglas
G. Baird et al., The Dynamics of Large and Small Chapter 11 Cases: An Empirical Study
37 (Int’l Ctr. for Fin. at Yale Sch. of Mgmt., Working Paper No. 05-29, 2007), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=866865.
94. See, e.g., Skeel, supra note 60, at 939 (describing the indifference of another party
since they will get paid from the collateral in any event).
95. See Berringer, supra note 59, at 376-78 (explaining how § 363 sales are a direct
result of the Bankruptcy Code’s problems with collective action and maintaining proper
governance over the firm during bankruptcy).
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creditors, solicitation of their consent, and creditor voting, and the
provisions prolong the bankruptcy process. 96 The steel company LTV, for
example, spent seven years in Chapter 11, consuming most of the assets
remaining in the company. 97 Eastern Airlines failed to complete a plan of
While Chapter 11 emphasizes
reorganization after two years. 98
rehabilitation of economically viable companies, sales have enabled
secured creditors to claim the value of their collateral as quickly as
possible, without regard for the effect that their actions have on
restructuring such companies. 99
Courts have interpreted gaps in the statutory language of Section 363
to support more sales. 100 The statute left unanswered aspects of when sales
could be conducted and how. 101 It does not address who may propose
them, and under what circumstances, or on what basis courts should
approve them. 102 Originally, the courts viewed Section 363 as applying
only to rare situations involving perishable assets. 103 In cases such as
Guaranty Corp. v. Braniff Airways Inc., which involved a bankrupt airline,
the court demanded evidence that no time could be spared without the
assets of the company dissipating, and they rejected attempts by secured
creditors to use Section 363 to avoid the more onerous requirements of
traditional Chapter 11. 104 Later, in cases such as Holders v. Lionel Corp.
(In re Lionel. Corp.), which concerned a bankrupt toy company, courts
looked only for business justifications to confirm the sales. 105 The Second
96. See Gennady Zilberman, Bankruptcy Section 363(b) Sales:
Market Test
Procedures and Heightened Scrutiny of Expedited Sales May Prevent Abuses and Safeguard
Creditors without Limiting the Power of the Courts, 5 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 241,
251, 253-54 (2010) (showing how non-consenting creditors may object to a plan that is not
in their best interest).
97. David A. Skeel, Jr., Competing Narratives in Corporate Bankruptcy: Debtor in
Control vs. No Time to Spare, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1187, 1199 (2009).
98. White, supra note 70, at 150.
99. See Geva, supra note 56, at 379-80 (asserting that such secured creditors prefer
these sales because they have priority and such transactions reduce risk, and that courts can
correct the inefficiency as well as reduce the frequency of these sales through “increased
scrutiny and better information flow to creditors”).
100. See, e.g., David R. Kuney, Overview of the Bankruptcy System, in 2013 ALI-ABA
COURSE OF STUDY: COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE DEFAULTS, WORKOUTS, REORGANIZATIONS
611.
101. Klee & Levin, supra note 48, at 480-81.
102. See, e.g., Zilberman, supra note 96, at 246 (noting that the language of Section
363(b) gave little guidance).
103. See, e.g., Rotem & Dekel, supra note 47, at 331-32 (noting that Section 363(b) was
enacted to aid firms with finances or assets depreciating with each day).
104. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., Cont’l Air Lines, Inc. v. Braniff Airways, Inc. (In re
Braniff Airways, Inc.), 700 F.2d 935, 940 (5th Cir. 1983); James J. White, Death and
Resurrection of Secured Credit, 12 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 139, 148 (2004).
105. Comm. of Equity Sec. Holders v. Lionel Corp. (In re Lionel Corp.), 722 F.2d 1063,
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Circuit stated in Lionel: “[t]here must be some articulated business
justification, other than appeasement of major creditors, for using, selling,
or leasing property outside the normal course of business before the
bankruptcy judge may order such a disposition under 363(b).” 106 In the
wake of Lionel, however, even the “appeasement of major creditors”
evolved into sufficient justification. 107 The U.S. Bankruptcy Court in the
Southern District of New York permitted a sale of the assets of the
financial services firm Lehman Brothers on the basis of the exigencies of
the subprime mortgage crisis. 108
Courts thus have facilitated deviations from the goals of Chapter 11.109
Increasingly lenient interpretations of Section 363 have supported a
resurgent creditors’ race. 110 By expanding the availability of sales, the
courts have allowed secured creditors more opportunities to claim their
collateral and override the “breathing space” in which management
traditionally negotiated with all of a company’s creditors in an orderly
way. 111
C. Chrysler
The Section 363 asset sale of the automobile manufacturer Chrysler
highlighted the trend of increasing DIP lender control in bankruptcy. 112 A
high-profile case, it involved the anomaly of the government acting as DIP
lender and working to safeguard the interests of employees and
pensioners. 113 The magnitude of the power that the government wielded
nevertheless illustrated how secured creditors with other objectives could
utilize the sales to appropriate assets from employees and other creditors.114
The case therefore underscored potential concerns over the changes that

1069-72 (2d Cir. 1983).
106. In re Lionel Corp., 722 F.2d 1063, 1070 (2d Cir. 1983).
107. White, supra note 104, at 162.
108. See, e.g., In re Lehman Bros. Holdings, Inc., 416 B.R. 392 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008);
David A. Skeel, Competing Narratives in Corporate Bankruptcy: Debtor in Control v. No
Time to Spare, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1187, 1200 (2009) (noting that the Bankruptcy Court
acknowledged the extraordinary nature of the case and approved the sale).
109. See supra text accompanying notes 100-108.
110. See supra text accompanying notes 39-46 (discussing the coordinating effects of
bankruptcy law, which serve to preventing the creditors’ race).
111. See, e.g., Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 44, at 1238.
112. See, e.g., Ben-Ishai & Lubben, supra note 6, at 599 (noting that GM and Chrysler’s
sales are part of a larger trend).
113. See, e.g., Korres, supra note 77, at 963-64 (noting that one of the concerns of the
government was a voluntary employees’ beneficiary association (VEBA) to protect
employee health care).
114. Geva, supra note 56, at 394-95.
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have occurred in large corporate bankruptcies. 115 While Chapter 11 in
theory protected against abuses of secured lenders through the imposition
of a collective forum, secured lenders, acting as DIP financiers, have
seemed to leverage Section 363 asset sales to force speedy fire sales to the
detriment of the overall interests of creditors.116
When it filed for bankruptcy, Chrysler’s balance sheet read as follows:
Senior Secured Bond Holders: first priority $6.9 Billion
Daimler & Cerberus: second priority lien $2.0 Billion
U.S. Government: third priority lien $4.0 Billion
UAW/Voluntary Employee Beneficiary Association: unsecured $10.6
Billion
Unsecured creditors: Primarily Tier 1 component suppliers $2.0
Billion 117
The U.S. Treasury and the Canadian government provided $5 billion
in DIP financing that carried restrictive covenants typical of the
arrangements forged by other secured creditors. 118 Under the terms of the
loan, Chrysler had to, among other actions: 1) comply with a weekly
budget; 2) refrain from making changes to management; 3) obtain approval
for auction procedures within one week of filing for bankruptcy; and 4)
conclude an asset sale within 40 days of filing. 119 If the company failed to
meet any of the covenants, the loan would terminate, forcing Chrysler into
immediate liquidation.120

115. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird, Lessons from the Automobile Reorganizations, 4 J.
LEGAL ANALYSIS 271, 272 (2012) (noting the potential for abuse); Korres, supra note 77, at
961.
116. See, e.g., Edward R. Morrison, Chrysler, GM and the Future of Chapter 11 11 (Ctr.
for L. & Econ. Stud. at Colum., Working Paper No. 365, 2009), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1529734 (citing a study of low
recoveries of unsecured creditors in asset sales as compared to reorganization and noting the
risk of fire sales).
117. See, e.g., Kan Munn & Bill Byrne, Distributions to Lower Priority Creditors in
Chrysler’s Bankruptcy: A Car Wreck Waiting to Happen for Investors? 110-11 (Am.
Bankr. Inst. Cent. States Bankr. Workshop Conference Paper for Panel on The Evolving
Chapter 11—Current and Future Issues in Chapter 11 Cases, 2010).
118. See, e.g., Berringer, supra note 59, at 380-81 (noting Chrysler’s requirements); A.
Joseph Warburton, Understanding the Bankruptcies of Chrysler and General Motors: A
Primer, 60 SYRACUSE L. REV. 531, 536 (2010).
119. Edward R. Morrison, Chrysler, GM and the Future of Chapter 11 8 (Ctr. for L. &
Econ. Stud. at Colum., Working Paper No. 365, 2009), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1529734.
120. Id. at 10.
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Chrysler sold its good assets to a newly-created entity, New CarCo
Acquisition LLC. 121 The new entity paid $2 billion for them and also
assumed some of Chrysler’s existing liabilities.122 The first-priority
secured creditors received the $2 billion as payment towards their $6.9
billion claim, a recovery of only 29 cents on the dollar, while the other
creditors and equity holders received nothing. 123 New CarCo also paid the
United Auto Workers trust, the entity that had provided benefits to Chrysler
employees, $1.5 billion in cash, and gave it a 55% equity stake in the new
company along with a $4.6 billion equity note.124 In return, the United
Auto Workers union accepted a reduced wage structure and reduced future
pension payments. 125 Some have argued that the arrangement violated the
absolute priority rule, which requires creditors in bankruptcy to recoup
assets in accordance with the priority rights associated with their loans,
because the United Auto Workers trust recovered assets when the secured
creditors had not yet been paid in full.126 Others have argued, however, that

121. See, e.g., Stephen J. Lubben, The Truth About Detroit’s Bankruptcies, FORBES
(July 26, 2009, 2:00 PM), http://www.forbes.com/2009/07/26/chrysler-gm-bankruptcyopinions-contributors-chapter-11-tarp.html.
122. See, e.g., Warburton, supra note 118, at 534-35 (noting that such liabilities
included obligations to the UAW Trust).
123. See, e.g., Geva, supra note 56, at 392; Baird, supra note 115, at 278 (“Chrysler, the
debtor that filed the bankruptcy petition, gave everything it had to its secured creditors. It
did not pay its general creditors anything. It sold its assets to New CarCo for $2 billion in
cash.”); Munn & Byrne, supra note 117, at 111. (“Under the Government-orchestrated plan,
the above participants would receive / recover or lose the following: Senior Secured Bond
Holders – received $2.0 Billion in cash a - 29% recovery, Daimler & Cerberus – received $
0 cash – 100% Loss, U.S. Government – received $ 0 cash – 100% Loss + stock in New
Chrysler, UAW / VEBA Trust – Unsecured – received a $4.6 Billion Note – 43% recovery
+ stock in New Chrysler unsecured Creditors – primarily paid in full through § 365 and §
503(b)(9) (noting that the recovery percent varies according to the party calculating the
“cure” amount) – 99% recovery”); Warburton, supra note 118, at 534-35 (“The crucial
features of the Chrysler reorganization are set forth in a master transaction agreement, and
are illustrated in Figure 1 hereto. Under the agreement, with the approval of the bankruptcy
court, Old Chrysler sold substantially all its operating assets to a newly-formed entity, New
CarCo Acquisition LLC (“New Chrysler”) in exchange for $2 billion in cash from New
Chrysler and the assumption of some of Old Chrysler’s liabilities (including certain
obligations owed to the UAW Trust). The $2 billion received by Old Chrysler was
distributed to the first-priority secured lenders. Since the first-priority secured lenders were
owed $6.9 billion, they received twenty-nine cents on the dollar, leaving no assets for junior
secured lenders or for unsecured creditors (including the UAW Trust). Chrysler’s equity
holders received nothing.”).
124. Munn & Byrne, supra note 117, at 111.
125. Warburton, supra note 118, at 536-37.
126. Three Indiana state pension funds objected to the sale on this basis. See, e.g., John
A. Nasr, Selling Assets Free and Clear of an Interest in Property Under § 363(f), 11
DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 237, 247 (2013) (noting that the pension funds objected on the
grounds that the plan was inconsistent with the absolute priority rule).
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Chrysler paid the $2 billion raised in the asset sale to the secured creditors
in satisfaction of the absolute priority rule, and a different entity, New
CarCo, awarded the money that the union received. 127
The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York
approved the sale. 128 The Court sought a business justification for the sale
of assets outside the ordinary course of business, pursuant to the Lionel
standard. 129 It found that the arrangements would preserve going concern
value and deemed its preservation a sufficient business reason.130 The
Court also used language in line with the earlier standard, articulated in
Braniff, which allowed for a sale only when assets could dissipate in a way
similar to melting ice cubes, even though the assets of Chrysler were fixed
and tangible. 131 On appeal to the Second Circuit, the Court stated that, even
“an automobile manufacturing business can be within the ambit of the
‘melting ice cube’ theory.” 132 The Second Circuit affirmed the decision of
the Bankruptcy Court, and the U.S. Supreme Court declined review. 133
The sale concluded in 42 days; however, the speed occurred without
the protections embedded in Chapter 11.134 Chrysler did not face any
disclosure requirements or a vote of all of the creditors, as it would have in
a traditional reorganization. 135 The company that emerged from the sale
maintained the same brand name, headquarters, employees, management,
and inventory of cars. 136 Creditors of the old company, rather than arm’s
127. See, e.g., Baird, supra note 115, at 278 (noting that New CarCo was never in
bankruptcy).
128. In re Chrysler LLC, 405 B.R. 84, 113 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009), aff’d, 576 F.3d 108
(2d Cir. 2009), cert. granted, judgment vacated sub nom. Indiana State Police Pension Trust
v. Chrysler LLC, 129 S. Ct. 2275 (2009) and vacated sub nom. In re Chrysler, LLC, 592
F.3d 370 (2d Cir. 2010); In re Gen. Motors Corp., 407 B.R. 463, 520 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2009), aff’d sub nom. In re Motors Liquidation Co., 428 B.R. 43 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) and aff’d
sub nom. In re Motors Liquidation Co., 430 B.R. 65 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
129. In re Chrysler LLC, 405 B.R. at 95-96; In re Lionel Corp., 722 F.2d 1063, 1071
(2d Cir. 1983).
130. In re Chrysler LLC, 405 B.R. at 95-96.
131. Id. at 96; See, e.g., Skeel, supra note 97, at 1200-01 (noting that the auto
company’s most significant assets––the plants and assembly line––are fixed and tangible).
132. In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d 108, 114 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. granted, judgment
vacated sub nom. Indiana State Police Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC, 129 S. Ct. 2275
(2009) and vacated sub nom. In re Chrysler, LLC, 592 F.3d 370 (2d Cir. 2010).
133. In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d at 127, vacated sub nom. Ind. State Police Pension
Trust v. Chrysler LLC, 129 S. Ct. 2275, 2276 (2009) (per curiam).
134. Korres, supra note 77, at 965-66. See also, Mark Roe & David Skeel, Assessing the
Chrysler Bankruptcy, 108 MICH. L. REV. 727, 728 (2010) (arguing that the Chrysler
bankruptcy process used undesirable mechanisms that the courts and Congress failed to
suppress).
135. Korres, supra note 77, at 965-66.
136. Brief for Appellants Indiana State Police Pension Trust et al. at 44, Ind. State
Police Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d 108 (2d Cir. 2009) (No. 09-2311-bk).
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length purchasers, held half of the equity. 137 The sale returned only a third
of the amount owed to first-lien secured creditors and never underwent a
genuine market test or judicial valuation.138
III.

BENEFIT/COST ANALYSIS

The rise of Section 363 asset sales in the U.S. appears to evidence the
pressures on bankruptcy law to withstand the incentives of secured
creditors to revert to a race to claim assets.139 While the sales reach
completion faster than collective negotiations, they inflict losses on
unsecured creditors. 140 This section explores the extent to which control by
secured creditors reduces costs through speed and the countervailing
burdens it imposes. 141 Losses to other creditors appear to outweigh the
savings from speed. 142
A. Speed and Expense
Chapter 11 is expensive; the shorter duration of Section 363 asset
sales reduces some costs. 143 This part explains how the sales generate
efficiencies from speed. 144
1. Expense of Chapter 11
The high costs of Chapter 11 can be conceived of as falling into two
categories. 145 Direct costs comprise professional fees and other payments
such as quarterly dues to the Trustee’s office, the arm of the Department of

137. Roe & Skeel, supra note 134, at 756.
138. Id. at 734.
139. See, e.g., Baird, supra note 115, at 291 (stating that the incremental protections
being discovered for sales under Section 363 are already embedded in Chapter 11 and that
the law should go straight to the end point rather than waiting for evolution).
140. See, e.g., Roe & Skeel, supra note 134, at 732 (stating that in view of Chrysler,
Section 363 has the potential benefit of quick repositioning but the potential to much
damage by bypassing Chapter 11 structure).
141. See infra Section III.A, B.
142. See Section III.B.
143. Korres, supra note 77, at 960; see, e.g., Lerner, supra note 55, at *2 (pointing out
the trend for large companies like Lehman Brothers, General Motors, and Blockbuster to
use Section 363 sales and liquidations to keep costs down when lenders are reluctant to
lend).
144. See infra Section III.A.1.
145. See, e.g., Stephen Lubben, Chapter 11 as Intrigue, 28 BANKING. & FIN. L. REV.
171, 173 (2012) (reviewing LYNN M. LOPUCKI & JOSEPH W. DOHERTY, PROFESSIONAL FEES
IN CORPORATE BANKRUPTCIES: DATA, ANALYSIS, AND EVALUATION).

KIRSHNER_FINAL (ARTICLE 4).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

546

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

3/26/2015 3:50 PM

[Vol. 17:2

Justice responsible for overseeing bankruptcy cases. 146 Indirect costs
include lost revenues, lost opportunities, and lost goodwill. Indirect costs
generally result in income transfers to competitors.147
Professional fees have accounted for a significant proportion of direct
costs. The bankruptcy estate compensates financial advisors, investment
bankers, appraisers, industry experts, counsel to companies, and counsel to
committees of unsecured creditors for their time. 148 The estate pays for
obtaining approvals for major operating decisions, resolving disputes
related to distribution priorities and collateral positions, adjudicating claim
objections, soliciting permission to use cash collateral, and petitioning the
court to confirm proposals. 149
Several studies have documented high and increasing fees. In a 2000
study, excluding distributions to secured creditors, professional fees
consumed more than seventeen cents of every dollar paid from bankruptcy
estates. 150 A 2011 study has indicated that between 1998 and 2007
professional fees increased by 25%, the equivalent of eight times the
general increase in prices over the same period.151 Another recent study
found that professional fees in middle-market Chapter 11 cases typically
approached or exceeded $1 million. 152 Of large Chapter 11 plans

146. Id. at 174.
147. Id. (“First, there are the direct costs, comprised chiefly of the professionals fees
associated with reorganization, but also including other lesser costs like court filing fees
and, in the United States, quarterly fees due to the United States Trustee’s office. In
addition, there are also indirect costs of a firm’s bankruptcy, which are more abstract but
include things like lost revenues, lost opportunities, and lost goodwill. Some of these costs
may be of concern to the firm’s stakeholders, but not to policymakers if, for example,
financial distress simply results in the shifting of sales from the distressed firm to a
competitor firm—unless the competitor is abroad.”).
148. Jill Nicholson, Guiding Clients Through the Chapter 11 Process, in CHAPTER 11
BANKRUPTCY AND RESTRUCTURING STRATEGIES 2013 EDITION: LEADING LAWYERS ON
NAVIGATING RECENT TRENDS, CASES, AND STRATEGIES AFFECTING CHAPTER 11 CLIENTS,
available at 2012 WL 5884858, at *5 (2012).
149. See, e.g., Lawder et al., supra note 82, at *2 (noting that avoidance of Chapter 11
may create savings because of the substantial costs associated with the Chapter 11 process
like approving major operating decisions, resolving disputes as to priorities, and claim
objections).
150. Stephen Ferris & Robert Lawless, The Expenses of Financial Distress: The Direct
Costs of Chapter 11, 61 U. PITT. L. REV. 629, 651 (2000).
151. LYNN M. LOPUCKI & JOSEPH W. DOHERTY, CHAPTER 11 AS INTRIGUE—
PROFESSIONAL FEES IN CORPORATE BANKRUPTCIES: DATA, ANALYSIS, AND EVALUATION 71
tbl. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
152. Jeffrey Wurst, Is Chapter 11 Still a Viable Option — Or Has High Cost Rendered
the Process Unaffordable?, ABF J., Mar. 2013, at 56, available at http://rmfpc.com/wpcontent/uploads/2013/03/Wurst-ABFJ-Mar-2013.pdf.
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confirmed in 2007, financial advisors received on average $213 million,
while attorneys received $523 million. 153
2. Speed of Sales Reduces Costs
Section 363 asset sales generally not only increase the recoveries of
secured creditors but also speed up the bankruptcy process.154 A recent
study concluded that the sales, coupled with a structured dismissal, resulted
in significantly lower professional fees than conventional Chapter 11
because they concluded more quickly. 155
Speed reduces direct expenses, preserving value in the bankruptcy
estate for creditors. 156 In traditional Chapter 11, by contrast, management
has 120 days in which to file a plan, plus potential extensions.157 Each day
that a company spends in Chapter 11 consumes additional assets in costs. 158
A prolonged process, moreover, can destroy companies unable to survive
long enough to complete it.159
Legal academics that support a contractualist theory of bankruptcy,
such as Barry Adler, Lucien Arye Bebchuk, and Alan Schwartz, have
argued for market-based solutions to corporate distress. 160 Negotiations

153. LOPUCKI & DOHERTY, supra note 151, at 85 fig. 5.1.
154. See, e.g., Jason Brege, An Efficiency Model of Section 363(b) Sales, 92 VA. L. REV.
1639, 1644 (2006) (offering a less cynical view of Section 363(b) suggesting that it is more
efficient at extracting value of the assets).
155. Wurst, supra note 152, at 56.
156. See, e.g., Valuation Issues a Key Topic at Chapter 11 Commission Hearing In Las
Vegas, 32 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 10, 128 (2013).
157. 11 U.S.C. § 1121(b) (2009); see also, In re Express One Int’l, Inc., 194 B.R. 98,
100 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1996) (stating that during the first 120 days of the Chapter 11 case,
only the debtor-in-possession may file a plan of reorganization).
158. See, e.g., Miller & Brennan, supra note 83 (“There’s a burn rate attached to this
Chapter 11. We don’t want to burn value. Sell the assets.”) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
159. See, e.g., Ben-Ishai & Lubben, supra note 6, at 622-23 (pointing to Lehman
Brothers as a case where the debtor had going-concern value but was unlikely to survive
long enough to complete a formal reorganization process).
160. See, e.g., Barry E. Adler, Financial and Political Theories of American Corporate
Bankruptcy, 45 STAN. L. REV. 311, 319-24 (1993) (suggesting that while market-based or ex
ante structuring proposals may offer some improvement over current bankruptcy law, each
could leave investors with substantial costs of reorganization, risk of dismemberment, or
restrictions on capital structure and thus, these proposals do not provide a conclusive reason
to expect that investors given the choice would adopt an alternative to bankruptcy law);
Lucian Arye Bebchuk, A New Approach to Corporate Reorganizations, 101 HARV. L. REV.
775, 776-77 (1988) (proposing a method where the participants in a reorganization would
receive a set of rights with respect to the securities of the reorganized company and these
rights are designed so that, whatever the reorganization value, the participants will never
end up with less than the value to which they are entitled); Robert K. Rasmussen, Debtor’s
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among creditors in traditional Chapter 11, they believe, waste time and
raise the possibility of holdout by dissenting creditors.161 They support
freeing assets from the plodding Chapter 11 claims resolution process.162
To the extent that asset sales reduce the length of bankruptcy, fees to
professionals paid for their time decrease in parallel.163 The UCLALoPucki Bankruptcy Research Database includes data on the number of
days it took individual companies to complete Section 363 asset sales, as
well as the dates on which companies filed for Chapter 11 and confirmed a
reorganization plan.164 After selecting for cases commenced in the years
Choice: A Menu Approach to Corporate Bankruptcy, 71 TEX. L. REV. 51, 117 (1992)
(noting that the case for forgoing Chapter 11 is strongest in the case of a publicly held firm
and sensible restraints are needed if the law begins allowing firms to change their
bankruptcy options); Alan Schwartz, A Contract Theory Approach to Business Bankruptcy,
107 YALE L.J. 1807, 1850-51 (1998) (arguing that the state should permit parties to contract
for the bankruptcy system that they prefer).
161. See, e.g., Miller & Waisman, supra note 3, at 159-60 (pointing to In re Armstrong
World Industries Inc. to demonstrate creditors—who previously indicated support of the
contractual model—filing objections after the court rejected the plan).
162. See, e.g., Ben-Ishai & Lubben, supra note 6, at 623 (stating that after a sale, the
debtor’s assets can be disengaged from the claims resolution process, allowing the business
to resume normal operations in a swift manner that does not depend on the pace of the
bankruptcy process).
163. See Lynn M. LoPucki & Joseph W. Doherty, The Determinants of Professional
Fees in Large Bankruptcy Reorganization Cases, 1 J. EMP. L. STUD. 111, 120 (2004) (stating
that their model indicates that the size of the firm and the length of time a case remains
pending are the strongest determinants of professional fees awarded in a bankruptcy case);
see also Edward I. Altman, Comment, Evaluating the Chapter 11 BankruptcyReorganization Process, 1993 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 2-4 (1993) (arguing for shortening
the reorganization period under Chapter 11 because time and out-of-pocket costs are
positively correlated); Julian R. Franks & Walter N. Torous, An Empirical Investigation of
U.S. Firms in Reorganization, 44 J. FIN. 747, 747-48, 751 (1989) (pointing out that Chapter
11 proceedings are costly and lengthy but firms still consider it the least costly because
equity holders bear little costs); Robert K. Rasmussen & Randall S. Thomas, Whither the
Race? A Comment on the Effects of the Delawarization of Corporate Reorganizations, 54
VAND. L. REV. 283, 295 (2001) (“fees may be correlated roughly with the length of the
bankruptcy proceeding. The longer the proceeding, the greater the fees.”); James J. White,
Harvey’s Silence, 69 AM. BANKR. L.J. 467, 473-74 (1995) (“[T]he largest and most palpable
costs of Chapter 11 arise from delay.”).
164. See UCLA-LoPucki Bankruptcy Research Database, UCLA SCHOOL OF LAW,
available at http://lopucki.law.ucla.edu/. The UCLA-LoPucki database contains five sets of
data on “more than one-thousand large public companies that have filed [Chapter 7 or
Chapter 11] bankruptcy cases since October 1 1979.” Id. The data set relied on for purposes
of this article was “The Cases Table,” which “consists of about 200 fields of regressionready data” displayed in a Microsoft Excel file. Id. Information regarding the precise
meaning of each data field is located in the User Protocol Manual. LYNN M. LOPUCKI,
PROTOCOLS FOR THE UCLA-LOPUCKI BANKRUPTCY RESEARCH DATABASE 32 (2015),
available at http://lopucki.law.ucla.edu/documentation/Protocols.pdf.
Citations to data discovered in the UCLA-LoPucki database throughout this article
refer to the data contained in “The Cases Table” Microsoft Excel file. To access this data
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2011 and 2012 by companies with assets of more than $100 million,
measured in 1980 dollars, the database lists twenty-five cases. 165 Two of
the companies, A123 Systems and Real Mex Restaurants, opted for Section
363 asset sales. 166 A123 Systems completed a sale in less than two months,
while Real Mex Restaurants required just over four months.167 For
companies that pursued a traditional Chapter 11, excluding those that prenegotiated a plan, only two completed the process in less than a year. 168
Speed has become more crucial in recent years. Some have argued
that corporate assets have become less tangible, as compared to the railroad
parts and steel machinery that companies of the Nineteenth-Century
primarily owned. 169 Knowledge and ideas will not remain in place during a
long restructuring: human capital will migrate to competing companies.170
When asset prices fall, as they have during the recent economic
contraction, speed grows increasingly important.171

set, one must submit a registration request to the Database Manager through the UCLALoPucki website. See Academic Request, UCLA-LoPucki Bankruptcy Research Database,
UCLA SCHOOL OF LAW, available at http://lopucki.law.ucla.edu/academic_form.htm
(providing the form for the academic request with accompanying instructions).
165. See Contents of the BRD, UCLA-LoPucki Bankruptcy Research Database, UCLA
SCHOOL OF LAW, available at http://lopucki.law.ucla.edu/contents_of_the_webbred.htm
(noting that the data set considers a company “large” if its “Annual Report reported assets
worth $100 million or more, measured in 1980 dollars (about $287 million in current
dollars.”)).
166. See UCLA-LoPucki Bankruptcy Research Database, supra note 164. This data is
displayed under the “Sale363” field in the “The Cases Table” Microsoft Excel file. See
LOPUCKI, supra note 164, at 32.
167. See UCLA-LoPucki Bankruptcy Research Database, supra note 164. This data is
displayed under the “DaysFiledto363” field in the “The Cases Table” Microsoft Excel file.
See LOPUCKI, supra note 164, at 15.
168. See UCLA-LoPucki Bankruptcy Research Database, supra note 164. This data is
displayed under the “DaysIn” field in the “The Cases Table” Microsoft Excel file. See
LOPUCKI, supra note 164, at 14. Note that one of these, Delta Petroleum Corporation, won
awards for best turnaround from the Global M&A Network. See GLOBAL M&A NETWORK,
TURNAROUND ATLAS AWARDS, CONGRATULATIONS: 2013 FINALISTS CIRCLE 5 (2013)
available at https://globalmanetwork.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/2013-FINALISTSCIRCLE-Annual-Turnaround-Atlas-Awards-June-25-2013.pdf.
169. See, e.g., Skeel, supra note 60, at 922 (noting that modern businesses depend on
knowledge and ideas as assets rather than hard assets).
170. Id.
171. See, e.g., Sarah Pei Woo, Simultaneous Distress of Residential Developers and
Their Secured Lenders: An Analysis of Bankruptcy & Bank Regulation, 15 FORDHAM J.
CORP & FIN. L. 617, 621 (2010) (stating that lenders need to liquidate quickly to preserve
the value of assets when these values are declining) (quoting Counsel for Barclays Bank in
the bankruptcy of the developer LandSource Communities Development).
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B. Cost to Unsecured Creditors
While Section 363 asset sales may offer some efficiency gains, they
impose losses on other creditors. 172 As classic “common pool” theory
predicts, control by secured creditors reduces overall utility and results in
agency costs and waste. 173
The evidence shows that secured creditors have appropriated benefits
for themselves using Section 363 asset sales while others have borne the
costs. 174 Without the collective protections of Chapter 11, secured creditors
have forced sales that pay out their own claims against the company,
regardless of the surplus lost to others. 175 They have sold companies
piecemeal that it may have been in the collective interest to rehabilitate.176
According to the 2007 study, Bankruptcy Fire Sales, by Lynn LoPucki
and Joseph Doherty of UCLA Law School, Section 363 asset sales yield
half the value of reorganizations.177 The sales generate 35% book value, as
compared to 91% in a traditional Chapter 11. 178 The database that LoPucki
and Doherty compiled indicates that two bankruptcy cases filed in 2011
and 2012 proceeded to Section 363 sales. 179 While unsecured creditors of
the first company, A123 Systems, recouped 65 cents on the dollar,180

172. See, e.g., Valuation Issues a Key Topic at Chapter 11 Commission Hearing In Las
Vegas, 32 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 10, 126 (2013) (noting that traditional restructuring rather
than Section 363 sales could help unsecured creditors recover value for their assets).
173. See, e.g., Brege, supra note 154, at 1643-44 (analyzing the agency costs of a
Section 363(b) sale that is at odds with the goals of Chapter 11 bankruptcy).
174. See, e.g., Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 32, at 464 (showing two forms of
expropriation where bank lenders take value for themselves at the expense of the debtor’s
other creditors).
175. See, e.g., Berringer, supra note 59, at 379 (noting that creditors who want to get out
of bankruptcy as quickly as possible will sacrifice the debtor’s needs for their own).
176. See, e.g., McCormack, supra note 50, at 549-50 (noting that Chapter 11 encourages
the externalization of risk in the form of sweetheart deals where lenders are incentivized to
cut costs rather than reorganize).
177. LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 57, at 4.
178. Id. at 3-4.
179. See UCLA-LoPucki Bankruptcy Research Database, supra note 164. This data is
displayed under the “Sale363” field in the “The Cases Table” Microsoft Excel file. See
LOPUCKI, supra note 164, at 32.
180. See UCLA-LoPucki Bankruptcy Research Database, supra note 164; see also In re
B456 Sys., Inc., No. 12-12859-KJC (D. Del. 2013) (proposed findings of fact, conclusions
of law and order confirming modified first amended joint plan of liquidation of B456
Systems, Inc., et al.); id. Exhibit D at 24 (reproducing the modified first amended joint plan
of liquidation and discussing treatment of general unsecured creditors); Former A123
Systems wins court approval of bankruptcy plan, FINANCIER WORLDWIDE, July 2013,
available at http://www.financierworldwide.com/ former-a123-systems-wins-courtapproval-of-bankruptcy-plan/#.VP3rVmRdXlM (noting that under the liquidation plan
unsecured creditors will “receive between 32.7 percent and 63.6 percent of their claims, or

KIRSHNER_FINAL (ARTICLE 4).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

DESIGN FLAWS IN THE BANKRUPTCY REGIME

3/26/2015 3:50 PM

551

unsecured creditors of the second company, Real Mex Restaurants,
recovered nothing. 181
Another database, the Bankruptcy DataSource, reports the final plans
that creditors confirmed in companies that completed conventional Chapter
11 procedures. 182 Using the twenty-five Chapter 11 cases commenced in
the years 2011 and 2012 obtained from the UCLA-LoPucki database, 183
and setting aside the companies that used prenegotiated plans, unsecured
creditors received less than 100 cents on the dollar in only three Chapter 11
cases. 184 Unsecured creditors also earned a full recovery in many, though
by no means all, of the prenegotiated plans. 185 Secured creditors that have
forced Section 363 asset sales have therefore appeared to interfere with the
value creation that could have resulted from a traditional reorganization. 186
Asset sales often result in assets being undervalued and sold at a lower
price due in part to a classic economics dilemma. DIP lenders generally
have informational advantages over other potential bidders. 187 Before
providing post-petition funding, they have opportunities to investigate the
bankrupt companies. 188 They can continue to monitor the financial
condition of the companies they have lent to.189 American Airlines, for
example, gained access to the financial records of TWA Airlines by

around 65 cents in [sic] the dollar”). This data is displayed under the “Distribunsec” field in
the “The Cases Table” Microsoft Excel file. See LoPucki, supra note 164, at 18.
181. See UCLA-LoPucki Bankruptcy Research Database, supra note 164; see also
Lance Duroni, Noteholders Scoop Up Real Mex Assets For $126M, LAW 360 (Feb. 10,
2012, 6:21 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/308852/noteholders-scoop-up-real-mexassets-for-126m (noting that “the deal provides no recovery for unsecured creditors”). This
data is displayed under the “Distribunsec” field in the “The Cases Table” Microsoft Excel
file. See LOPUCKI, supra note 164, at 18.
182. The database is accessible through the Lexis database, operated by LexisNexis,
under the “Find A Source” tab.
183. See supra text accompanying note 165.
184. These figures result from the final plans accessible in the Bankruptcy DataSource
database, setting aside those companies that had prenegotiated plans, and then looking at the
creditor recoveries in the remaining plans.
185. Id.
186. See infra text accompanying notes 186-188. A company with a viable business
that continues as a going concern also employs workers, buys from suppliers, offers
products or services, and generates tax revenues. H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 220 (1977).
187. See, e.g., Korres, supra note 77, at 968-69 (using the example of a Chrysler
negotiation where the Treasury had direct control over the business outcome that favored
specific lenders over others).
188. See, e.g., Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 32, at 465 (stating that the postpetition
financer has better information than an outside bidder because it investigates the debtor and
monitors the financial condition before making a loan).
189. See, e.g., Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 44, at 1229 (noting that technology
allows a lender to stay apprised of a debtor’s activities).
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providing DIP financing, before bidding for its assets. 190 Other bidders,
consequently, typically understand that if they bid higher than the DIP
lender has, they will have bid too much. 191 Without time or access to
gather information to improve the accuracy of their offers, they underbid
the DIP lender or refrain from bidding at all. 192 Derby Cycles, a company
selling motorcycle accessories, debated whether to file for bankruptcy over
a period of eight months. 193 The owner of the company then spent an
additional five months preparing a bid to buy the assets in a Section 363
asset sale. 194 The public bidding window for the assets, by contrast, lasted
for only five weeks. 195
DIP lenders may also intentionally bid low because losing to
competitors does not harm them. 196 They frequently have contracted to
receive termination fees that compensate them when they are outbid.197 In
a Section 363 asset sale of the photography company Polaroid, the DIP
lender received a termination fee of $5 million, even after it attempted to
discourage other bidders by misrepresenting the worth of corporate
divisions. 198
The original concerns of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code extended beyond
returning value to secured creditors.199 As the Congressional record
evidences, the Code sought to protect the investing public, protect jobs,
save troubled businesses, reduce the impact of bankruptcy on the
community, and further the public interest. 200 According to the House
report:
The purpose of a business reorganization case, unlike a
liquidation case, is to restructure a business’s finances so that it
190. Id. at 1249.
191. Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 32, at 465.
192. Id.
193. Elizabeth B. Rose, Chocolate, Flowers, and § 363(b): The Opportunity for
Sweetheart Deals without Chapter 11 Protections, 23 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 249, 282
(2006).
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. See, e.g., id. at 281 (describing the no-lose situation for credit bidders because their
low bid would give them more value than they paid for and an outbid would give them a
termination fee).
197. Id.
198. Lynn M. LoPucki, COURTING FAILURE: HOW COMPETITION FOR BIG BANKRUPTCY
CASES IS CORRUPTING THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS 179 (2005).
199. NLRB v. Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 528 (1983); see, e.g., MILLER & WAISMAN, supra
note 3, at 149 (noting that judges used to further the policies of rehabilitation and
reorganization underlying the Bankruptcy Code of 1978).
200. See, e.g., Gerard McCormack, Super-Priority New Financing And Corporate
Rescue, 2007 J. BUS. L. 701, 720.
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may continue to operate, provide its employees with jobs, pay its
creditors, and produce a return for its stockholders. The premise
of a business reorganization is that assets that are used for
production in the industry for which they were designed are more
valuable than those same assets sold for scrap. 201
Chapter 11 protected general creditors through the procedural
requirements that asset sales now eschew. 202 The negotiation process
among dispersed creditors in Chapter 11 promoted information dispersal,
transparency, employee voice, and agency. 203 Debtor rehabilitation and the
preservation of jobs necessitated their involvement. 204 The lack of minority
safeguards in Section 363 asset sales, by contrast, appears to have made it
possible for secured creditors to manipulate the value of businesses to
benefit themselves. 205 They have short-circuited the protections embedded
in Chapter 11 designed to defend others against the costs of a creditors’
race. 206
IV.

UK REALITY

The UK initially appears to suggest a potential middle ground in light
of the trend in the U.S. of secured creditors bypassing collective
procedures, at the expense of other creditors, including employees. 207
While secured creditors in the U.S. have avoided the rules of Chapter 11, 208
the UK offers a less rule-based procedure protective of group interests.209
The explicit English policy has been to decrease secured creditor control to
201. H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 220 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.A. §§ 5963, 6179.
202. See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Anapolsky & Jessica F. Woods, Pitfalls in Brazilian
Bankruptcy Law for International Bond Investors, 8 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 397, 444 (2013)
(listing the ways a Section 363 sale protects the integrity of the sale process).
203. See, e.g., Rose, supra note 193, at 280 (2006) (noting that §363(b) sales lack the
procedural safeguards in traditional reorganizations).
204. See, e.g., Geva, supra note 56 at 380 (explaining the reasons why sales of company
assets in today’s context departs from Chapter 11’s original intention).
205. LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 57, at 3.
206. See, e.g., Brege, supra note 154, at 1669 (describing the three agency problems
creditors face when deciding whether to sell an asset under Section 363(b)).
207. See, e.g., Arturo Bris & Ning Zhu, The Dynamics of Large and Small Chapter 11
Cases: An Empirical Study 37 (Yale Int’l Ctr. for Fin., Working Paper No. 05-29, 2007)
(suggesting that existing Chapter 11 practices have increasingly taken the form of the
market-based alternatives proposed by academics).
208. See, e.g., Korres, supra note 77, at 961 (discussing the fact that powerful creditors
are often able to manipulate the system in such a way that increases their influence at the
expense of smaller creditors).
209. See, e.g., Tribe, supra note 8, at 470 (noting the strength of the UK statute is its
substance over form approach which enables its less rule-based approach).
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achieve more effective corporate rehabilitation.210 In reality, however,
secured creditors in the UK have reinstated their dominance in spite of
reforms to English bankruptcy laws, and the creditors’ race has reemerged
there too. 211
A. Receivership to Administration
The UK government has sought to promote collectivity in
bankruptcy. 212 In 2002, the government enacted the Enterprise Act in order
to decrease secured creditor control and realize a more robust culture of
corporate rescue. 213 The Act largely abolished the dominant insolvency
procedure at the time, Administrative Receivership, which secured
creditors controlled and used to maximize their own recoveries. 214 The Act
introduced a new, alternative Administration procedure intended to enable
economically viable companies to continue in their businesses, for the
benefit of all creditors.215
In 1977 the government established the Cork Committee to devise
procedures for corporate restructuring. Without any official avenues for
210. See, e.g., DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY, INSOLVENCY––A SECOND
CHANCE, 2001, Cm. 5234, at foreword (U.K.), available at
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/263523/5234.
pdf (proclaiming that policies that give control of the direction and outcome of the
bankruptcy proceeding to the secured creditor are outdated).
211. This article uses the term “bankruptcy” in describing the U.S. and the UK for
consistency, even though the English term properly should be “insolvency,” as technically
the term “bankruptcy” applies only to English individuals, not English companies.
212. See, e.g., DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY, supra note 210, at Annex D, ¶ 2.5
(stating that while there might be increased pressure on the court system with more
administration orders, this impact will be offset by the streamlining of the administration
procedure).
213. See, e.g., INSOLVENCY SERV., CORPORATE INSOLVENCY IN THE UNITED KINGDOM:
THE IMPACT OF THE ENTERPRISE ACT 2002 ON REALISATIONS AND COSTS IN CORPORATE
RESCUE PROCEEDINGS, 2006, at 5 (U.K.), available at http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/
download?doi=10.1.1.96.6853&rep=rep1&type=pdf (explaining the policy shift away from
a concentrated creditor model of governance).
214. See, e.g., Sandra Frisby, In Search of a Rescue Regime: The Enterprise Act 2002,
67 MODERN L. REV. 247, 252 (2004) (analyzing the new policies that were designed to
create a better corporate rescue environment in which there was in general a fairer system of
insolvency distribution).
215. See William Goddard, The Revolution of the Times: Recent Changes in U.K.
Insurance Insolvency Laws and the Implications of Those Changes Viewed from A U.S.
Perspective, 10 CONN. INS. L.J. 139, 152-53 (2004); Bruce Johnston, Peter Sharp, &
Yasseen Gailani, Encouraging Company Rescue: Proposals for Reforming the UK’s
Insolvency Laws, 5 PRATT’S J. OF BANKR. L. 537, 546 n.3 (2009); Korres, supra note 77, at
971 (discussing how the refined standard attempted to make the business justification
standard more flexible, but in the end these loose business judgment standards can be
manipulated easily).
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rehabilitation, English companies frequently liquidated unnecessarily,
causing job losses and low creditor returns.216 In response, the Cork
Committee drafted a report (“Cork Report”) that stressed the importance of
rescuing bankrupt companies whenever possible.217 The report stated that
“good modern insolvency law” should “provide the means for the
preservation of viable commercial enterprises capable of making a useful
contribution to the economic life of the country.” 218
The Insolvency Act of 1986 established Administrative Receivership
on the basis of the suggestions of the Cork Committee. 219 The new process
empowered secured creditors to appoint agents to act on their behalf to
recoup the value of their collateral.220 The Cork Committee felt that they
should be able to monitor management and then act quickly and
independently out of court, without the delays that negotiations among
other creditors would generate. 221 The Committee emphasized the benefits
of procedures quick to initiate and flexible in outcome. 222
Secured creditors used Administrative Receivership to quickly cash
out their holdings in a way similar to a Section 363 asset sale.223 The terms
of secured lending arrangements, resembling DIP financing agreements in
the U.S., set out procedures by which the creditors could appoint receivers
to represent their interests. 224 The agreements enumerated triggers for the
appointments, such as the companies becoming unable to pay their debts as
they fell due. 225

216. See, e.g., DELOITTE & TOUCHE TAX & LEGAL, BANKRUPTCY AND A FRESH START:
STIGMA ON FAILURE AND LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF BANKRUPTCY 2, available at
http://www.pedz.uni-mannheim.de/daten/edz-h/gdb/02/report_uk.pdf
(discussing
compulsory requirements for companies that restructured during the 1970s).
217. INSOLVENCY LAW AND PRACTICE: REPORT OF THE REVIEW COMMITTEE, 1982, Cm.
8558, ¶ 198 (U.K.) [hereinafter Cork Report].
218. Id.
219. See, e.g., DELOITTE & TOUCHE TAX & LEGAL, supra note 216, at 2 (discussing how
the Act incorporated the suggestions of the Cork Committee).
220. See, e.g., Nick Segal, The Effect of Reorganization Proceedings on Security
Interests: The Position Under English and U.S. Law, 32 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 927, 943 (2007)
(analyzing the effect of how the Act allowed for agents to represent secured creditors).
221. See, e.g., John Armour et al., The Impact of the Enterprise Act 2002, 5 EUR.
COMPANY & FIN. L. REV. 148, 161 (2008) (discussing the Cork Committee’s desire to act
quickly and independently of the court).
222. Id. (discussing the benefits of flexible outcomes and quick procedures when
dealing with restructuring).
223. Id. (analyzing the process by which secured creditors used Administrative
Receiverships to cash out their holdings).
224. ALAN DIGNAM, HICKS & GOO’S CASES AND MATERIALS ON COMPANY LAW 515
(Oxford Univ. Press 2011).
225. LEN SEALY & SARAH WORTHINGTON, SEALY & WORTHINGTON’S CASES AND
MATERIALS IN COMPANY LAW 778 (Oxford Univ. Press 2013).
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Secured creditors could push companies into Administrative
Receivership without support from other creditors or corporate directors.226
The Insolvency Act of 1986 had established additional rescue procedures,
Administration and the Company Voluntary Arrangement (CVA). 227 Both
emphasized participation by all creditors. 228 Secured creditors, however,
prevented companies from using either process.229 The Receivership
legislation permitted secured creditors to appoint receivers for companies
already undergoing Administrations or CVAs and divert them into
Receivership instead. 230
Upon the appointment of an administrative receiver, legal control of
the company transferred from the directors to the receiver. 231 The company
still traded, still retained the same management, and still held legal title to
its assets. 232 The receiver, however, managed the company and did so
solely on behalf of the secured creditor that appointed him. 233 The receiver
acted for the company as an agent would, but acted with the primary aim of
recouping the value of the secured creditor’s collateral. 234
While initially the Cork Committee supported Administrative
Receivership as an instrument of corporate rescue, recession and a growing
sense that economically viable firms emerged from Receivership into
liquidation made its dominance seem increasingly problematic.235 The
Committee conceived of bankruptcy as a means for advancing the
collective interests of corporate stakeholders. 236 The Cork Report stated:
226. VANESSA FINCH, CORPORATE INSOLVENCY LAW: PERSPECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES
241 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2002).
227. See, e.g., DELOITTE AND TOUCHE TAX & LEGAL, supra note 216, at 2 (analyzing the
additional rescue procedures that the Insolvency Act of 1986 created).
228. See, e.g., ROGER BARKER , INSTITUTE OF DIRECTORS, DOES THE UK NEED CHAPTER
11? 19 (2009), available at https://www.iod.com/MainWebsite/Resources/Document/
article_chapter_11.pdf (pointing out that Administration and the CVA emphasized the
importance of participation by all creditors).
229. See, e.g., Armour et al., supra note 221, at 154-55 (discussing the challenges of
implementation of these new processes).
230. See id. (explaining how secured creditors were able to circumvent the new
legislation).
231. DIGNAM, supra note 224, at 516; FINCH, supra note 226, at 241.
232. DIGNAM, supra note 224, at 515; FINCH, supra note 226, at 242.
233. See, e.g., Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Control of Wealth in Bankruptcy, 82 TEX.
L. REV. 795, 819 (2004).
234. See, e.g., ROY GOODE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE INSOLVENCY LAW 217 (Sweet &
Maxwell, 4th ed. 2011); SEALY & WORTHINGTON, supra note 225, at 778-79.
235. See, e.g., D.C. Webb, An Economic Evaluation of Insolvency Procedures in the
United Kingdom: Does the 1986 Insolvency Act Satisfy the Creditors’ Bargain?, 43
OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 139, 152 (1991) (addressing the problems with Administrative
Receivership).
236. Sandra Frisby, Insolvency Law and Insolvency Practice:
Principles and
Pragmatism Diverge?, 10 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 1, 14 (2011).
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We believe that a concern for the livelihood and well-being of
those dependent upon an enterprise, which may well be the
lifeblood of a whole town or even a region, is a legitimate factor
to which a modern law of insolvency must have regard. The
chain reaction consequent upon any given failure can potentially
be so disastrous to creditors, employees and the community that it
must not be overlooked. 237
The development of a rescue culture in the UK, the original animus of
Administrative Receivership, eventually caught up with its realities and
compelled its restriction.238 The incentives of administrative receivers
appeared skewed to many, as the receivers had no obligation to try to
rehabilitate bankrupt companies.239 Acting only in the interests of the
secured creditors that appointed them, they attempted restructurings only
when doing so would increase the recoveries of those creditors.240
Uncertain attempts at rescue, however, generally did not appear likely to
increase recoveries, and they instead quickly realized the value of the
Increasingly, therefore, it seemed that Administrative
collateral. 241
Receivership was thwarting corporate rescue.242
Moreover, the power that the procedures accorded to secured creditors
raised fairness concerns. 243 Administrative receivers, acting to recoup the
value of secured assets, decreased returns to other creditors without their
consent. 244 The other creditors appeared to be paying for secured creditor
recoveries. 245

237. Cork Report, supra note 217, at ¶ 204.
238. See, e.g., Keith Crawford, The Law and Economics of Orderly and Effective
Insolvency (Dec. 2012) (unpublished Ph.D thesis, University of Nottingham), available at
http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/13372/1/Keith_Crawford_Doctoral_Thesis_Submitted_Final
_Draft.pdf.
239. See, e.g., Lathia v. Dronsfield Bros. [1987] B.C.L.C. 321 (noting that is unclear
what duties are owed by a receiver but that the context can help identify those duties);
DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY, supra note 210, at ¶¶ 2.2-2.3.
240. See, e.g., DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY, supra note 210, at ¶¶ 2.2-2.3
(discussing the skewed incentives of administrative receivers).
241. See, e.g., Rizwaan Jameel Mokal, Administrative Receivership and
Administration—An Analysis, 57 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 355 (analyzing the effects of
receivers on corporate rescue).
242. See, e.g., DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY, supra note 210, at ¶ 2.1
(explaining why attempts at corporate rescue were often scuttled).
243. FINCH, supra note 226, at 262.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 263.
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The perceived problems with Administrative Receivership found their
way into a series of government reports, culminating in legislative changes.
In 1997, the New Labour government came to power and initiated a review
of business rescue and restructuring. 246 The review determined that secured
creditor control stymied rescue objectives.247 The 2001 government white
paper Insolvency – A Second Chance reiterated the same argument. 248 The
white paper reviewed the goals of the Cork Committee and concluded that
Administrative Receivership inhibited them. 249 The paper criticized
Administrative Receivership for diminishing returns to unsecured
creditors. 250
The Enterprise Act 2002 therefore reformed English insolvency
procedures to end most uses of Administrative Receivership, initially
taking English law in a direction opposite from the American trend. 251 The
Enterprise Act put into practice the 2001 white paper and revamped
existing bankruptcy procedures in an attempt to increase corporate
The new legislation instituted changes to the existing
rescue. 252
Administration process in order to make it more attractive to companies
and creditors and to prevent Receivership from displacing it. 253
B. New Administration
Reforms to Administration initially undercut secured creditor control
of English bankruptcy and forced the creditors to join a more collaborative
process. 254 The Enterprise Act largely eliminated Administrative

246. See Review Group, A Review of Company Rescue and Business Reconstruction
Mechanisms, The Insolvency Service (2000).
247. GERARD MCCORMACK, CORPORATE RESCUE LAW – AN ANGLO-AMERICAN
PERSPECTIVE 54 (Edward Elgar Publ’g. 2008).
248. DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY, supra note 210, at ¶¶ 2.1-2.3 (U.K.)
249. Id. at ¶ 2.1.
250. Id. at ¶ 2.3 .
251. See, e.g., Richard Nevins, A Thorough Analysis of the United Kingdom’s
Restructuring Process, ASPATORE (THOMSON REUTERS), at *2 (2010), available at 2010 WL
2848369 (“The title of that act speaks volumes, and indicates a genuine desire to liberalize
English bankruptcy law and stimulate a sense of ‘enterprise.’ The most important feature of
the Enterprise Act was to introduce a new administration regime with a clear focus on
corporate rescue, including the creation of an out-of-court route into administration.
Simultaneously, the Enterprise Act sought to scale back the right of secured lenders to
appoint an administrative receiver.”).
252. MCCORMACK, supra note 247, at 54.
253. BARKER, supra note 228, at 17, 19.
254. See, e.g., INSOLVENCY SERV., ADMINISTRATION GUIDANCE NOTES ¶ 2.2.1 (2003),
available
at
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20080610162606/http://www.
insolvency.gov.uk/insolvencyprofessionandlegislation/legislation/reform.htm.
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Receivership. 255 Instead of using it to race to grab assets, the Act
channeled secured creditors, in most instances, into Administration
procedures oriented towards corporate rescue.256 In Administration, outside
insolvency professionals, serving as administrators, assumed the
management of bankrupt companies and developed comprehensive
reorganization plans in the collective interest in consultation with all of the
creditors. 257
The new procedures, which remain in place, bear little resemblance to
U.S. Chapter 11. The new Administration requires companies to qualify as
“insolvent,” according to one of two definitions, prior to entry. 258 Once
Administration begins, control of the companies passes from the existing
management to outside administrators, known as the “insolvency
professionals.” 259 The rules do not enable one class of creditors to force
another to accept a course of action against its will, as American
bankruptcy law does, and they offer no special priority to post-petition
lenders. 260 Administration also emphasizes rescuing businesses by selling
them to new owners, rather than continuing the original companies
intact. 261
Arguably, Administration therefore resembles a Section 363 asset
sale, but with more protections. 262 The English procedures balance
rescuing companies with achieving better results for creditors as a group.263
The legislation sets out a hierarchy of objectives.264 Rescuing companies as
going concerns tops the list, but if administrators conclude that rescue
would not be “reasonably practicable” or would not “achieve the best result
for the company’s creditors as a whole” then they need not pursue it.265
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Pontian Okoli, Rescue Culture in the United Kingdom: Realities and the Need for
a Delicate Balancing Act, 23 INT’L. COMP. COMM. L. REV. 61, 62 (2012).
258. Keith Wilson and Alpar Deniz, A Short Guide to UK Insolvency Law:
Administration, PAUL HASTINGS:
STAY CURRENT 1, 2 (2008), available at
http://www.paulhastings.com/assets/publications/1028.pdf.
259. ROY GOODE & EWAN MCKENDRICK, GOODE ON COMMERCIAL LAW 929 (2010).
260. See, e.g., McCormack, supra note 200, at 702.
261. For an explanation of the difference, see INSOLVENCY SERV., supra note 213, at 2;
McCormack, supra note 50, at 531 (explaining that “a speedy sale of company assets to a
purchaser who will put them to better use and, in the process, maintain employment is often
seen as the better result than the tedious process of restructuring the existing corporate
vehicle and getting the reorganization plan approved.”).
262. See, e.g., Vanessa Finch, Corporate Rescue Processes: The Search for Quality and
the Capacity to Resolve, 6 J. BUS. L. 502, 509 (2010) (describing stakeholder protections).
263. Gerard McCormack, Control and Corporate Rescue, 56 INT’L COMP. L. Q. at 529
(2007).
264. Insolvency Act, 1986, c. 45, sch. B1,¶ 3(1).
265. Id. ¶ 3(4).
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Control of a company in Administration shifts to an administrator,
usually an accountant, who has a duty to act in the collective interests of
the creditors. 266 While he manages the business, a moratorium prevents
secured creditors from reclaiming their collateral. 267 The moratorium stays
creditor enforcement actions, unless the administrator or a court approves
them.
The administrator generally has 28 days to obtain creditor approval of
a plan. At a meeting of the creditors, he presents a proposal for their
vote. 268 The creditors can amend it with his consent. 269 If, however, he
decides that he must act more quickly, he can sell the company without
waiting for the meeting. 270
When it occurs, creditor voting protects collective interests; however,
Administration retains specific protections on the rights of secured
creditors. 271 Although unsecured creditors must obtain court approval to
appoint an administrator, secured creditors may appoint them out of
court. 272 Without “cramdown,” the procedure in U.S. Bankruptcy law that
permits imposition of a plan on a class of non-consenting creditors,
Administration proposals must accommodate secured creditors in order to
succeed. 273 Secured creditors maintain rights to petition to lift the
moratorium against individual creditor actions and then claim their
collateral.274
Nevertheless, administrators are required to act in the interests of all
266. See id at ¶ 64 (“A company in administration or an officer of a company in
administration may not exercise a management power without the consent of the
administrator.”); McCormack, supra note 247, at 59.
267. Ian Fletcher & Christopher Arnold, An Introduction to UK Corporate Insolvency
Law, 1999 ANN. SURV. BANKR. L. 35 (1999).
268. See Insolvency Rules, 1986, S.I. 1986/1925, rule 2.43(1) (U.K.) (“at a creditors’
meeting in administration proceedings, a resolution is passed when a majority (in value) of
those present and voting, in person or by proxy, have voted in favour of it.”).
269. Insolvency Act, 1986, c. 45, sch. B1 ¶ 53(1).
270. See Re Transbus International Ltd [2004] 2 All ER 911. See generally, Insolvency
Act, 1986, c.45, sch. B1, ¶ 52(1). Creditors whose debts amount to at least 10 per cent of
the company’s total indebtedness can force the administrator to hold an initial creditors’
meeting, see Insolvency Act, 1986, c.45, sch. B1, ¶ 52(2).
271. See, e.g., Finch, supra note 262, at 510; see also DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND
INDUSTRY, supra note 210, at ¶ 2.6 (stating “whilst our aim is to guarantee unsecured
creditors a greater say in the process and its outcome, secured creditors should not feel at
any risk from our proposals”).
272. See, e.g., INSOLVENCY SERV., supra note 254, ¶ 3.2.1.
273. See Insolvency Act, 1986, c.45, sch. B1, ¶ 73(1)(a); McCormack, supra note 247,
at 296.
274. See Insolvency Act, 1986, c.45, sch. B1, ¶ 43; Alan Meek & John Reid, United
Kingdom: Lifting The Moratorium In Administration, MONDAQ, (Nov. 29, 2012), available
at
http://www.mondaq.com/x/208956/Insolvency+Bankruptcy/Lifting+The+Moratorium
+In+Administration.
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creditors and must comply with other English and European laws that
protect employee rights.275 Unlike in American Section 363 asset sales,
English administrators must use reasonable care to sell assets at the highest
possible price. 276 If the administrators continue employee contracts when
they assume control of a company, payment of the salaries of the
employees take priority over every other distribution from the bankruptcy
estate, including payment of the expenses of the administration and the
wages of the administrator. 277 Under EU law, employee contracts
automatically transfer to the buyer when a bankrupt company is sold.278
C. Resurgent Secured Creditor Race 279
Secured creditors, however, increasingly have circumvented the
protections on other creditors that distinguished English Administrations
from Section 363 asset sales in the U.S; they have regained control of the
bankruptcy process by planning sales before companies enter
Administration. 280 When the administrators take office, they immediately
affect the plans, without calling meetings or votes of creditors. 281 In 2009,
roughly half of all Administrations proceeded in this way. 282
The avoidance of provisions that protect collective interests has
occurred without any court review or the approval of less powerful
creditors. 283 Unlike in the U.S., where courts must authorize and approve

275. McCormack, supra note 247, at 59.
276. NICHOLAS BRIGGS AND PHILIP MAY, GUILDHALL CHAMBERS, IP LIABILITY: AN
OVERVIEW ¶ 30 (2008), available at http://www.guildhallchambers.co.uk/files/
IPLiability_NB&PMay.pdf.
277. Insolvency Act, 1986, c.45, sch. B1, ¶ 99(5) and (3).
278. The Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations, 2006, S.I.
2006/246, Regulation 4 (U.K.).
279. Note that the following section is a discussion of the rise of “prepackaged”
administrations in the UK. The author, however, has referred to these simply as
“prenegotiated administrations” to avoid confusion with “prepacks” in the U.S. Whereas
American prepacks must still be confirmed and voted on by all creditors, none of these
protections exist in the UK context. See, e.g., John Armour, The Rise of the ‘Pre-Pack’:
Corporate Restructuring in the UK and Proposals for Reform, in RESTRUCTURING
COMPANIES IN TROUBLED TIMES: DIRECTOR & CREDITOR PERSPECTIVES 60-64 (R.P Austin &
Fady JG Aoun eds. 2012). The English procedures, therefore, represent a more significant
departure from a collective resolution process.
280. Armour, supra note 279, at 43-44.
281. Sandra Frisby, Pre-Packs, Progress, Pragmatism, and Propriety: a View from the
United Kingdom, in 2009 NORTON ANN. REV. OF INTL. INSOLVENCY 8.
282. Finch, supra note 262, at 516.
283. FINCH, supra note 226, at 199; See, e.g., Vanessa Finch, Corporate Rescue: Who Is
Interested?, 3 J. BUS. L. 190, 201 (2012) (highlighting the lack of sanction toward less
powerful creditors).
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Section 363 asset sales, English courts do not review the substance of
Administration proposals. 284 When courts determine whether to affect
agreed plans of reorganization, they scrutinize only whether the
appointment of the administrators followed correct procedures. 285 While
secured creditors in the U.S. have also conducted advanced negotiations,
the companies have still had to complete Chapter 11 procedures, including
disclosure, plan confirmation, and creditor voting. 286
The prearranged sales in the UK have nevertheless saved the time and
cost of long, public negotiations in Administration. 287 English bankruptcy
law has made no special provision for creditors that lend to companies
already in bankruptcy. 288 Without the favorable treatment that American
law affords, companies have faced even greater pressure to reduce costs. 289
Although Parliament considered incentivizing post-petition lending in the
Enterprise Act, Members of Parliament decided not to offer any
inducements. 290
A survey of recent English Administrations underscores the resulting
pressure for funding. The costs of Administration appear to have consumed
the potential benefits of the process. Tracing the costs of Administration
and returns to creditors entails a two-step research process. In accordance
with English laws, companies that enter Administration must publish a
notice in the London Gazette, an official journal of record of the
government. 291 Once in Administration, the administrator must send
periodic progress reports to Companies House, the registrar of companies
in the UK. 292 The reports are available in the FAME database.293
284. See, e.g., FINCH, supra note 226, at 199; Lijie Qi, The Rise of Pre-Packaged
Corporate Rescue on Both Sides of the Atlantic, 20 INSOLVENCY INTELLIGENCE 129, 130-31
(2007) (comparing the administrative proposals within both the American and English
systems).
285. See, e.g., Armour, supra note 279, at 43 (indicating the transformation of corporate
restructuring in the UK).
286. Qi, supra note 284, at 133.
287. See, e.g., Frisby, supra note 281, at 8 (discussing the long, drawn out process of
public negotiations in UK law).
288. See, e.g., McCormack, supra note 50, at 515 (identifying the tendency in current
corporate restructuring to produce a more fragmented, difficult coordination during financial
distress).
289. See, e.g., Lijie Qi, Availability of Continuing Financing in Corporate
Reorganisations: The UK and US Perspective, 19 COMP. LAWYER 161, 166 (2008)
(emphasizing the ease with which American law affords companies in restructuring).
290. McCormack, supra note 200, at 702-03.
291. Insolvency Rules, 1986, S.I. 1986/1925, rule 2.10 (U.K).
292. Id. at rule 2.16 (requiring submission of proposals to the registrar of the company).
293. FAME is a database that provides a variety of financial and corporate information
about companies in the U.K. and Ireland. Fame, BUREAU VAN DIJK,
http://www.bvdinfo.com/en-gb/our-products/company-information/national-products/fame
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A search through every notice filed in the London Gazette in 2011 and
2012 uncovers ten companies with assets above £100 million that filed for
Administration; review of the reports of administrators for the ten
companies indicates how Administration expenses deprive creditors of
assets. In the ongoing Administration of the real estate development
company Ashpol, insolvency professionals have billed the bankruptcy
estate £279,114 for 997 hours of work they conducted between March 28,
2012 and September 12, 2013. 294 Payments to tax advisors during the
period totaled £8,000, and legal fees amounted to £86,505. 295 Advertising
to comply with statutory requirements cost a further £1,158.296 Meanwhile,
the administrators issued stock to secured creditors and distributed to them
66 pence per share, less costs and expenses.297 At the time of the report,
unsecured creditors had not recovered any assets.298 Similarly, in the
Administration of the nightclub operating company, Luminar Group
Holdings, the administrators billed the bankruptcy estate £5,318,156
between October 27, 2011 and August 2013 in an ongoing Administration
Legal fees totaled
and incurred further expenses of £79,980. 299
300
£1,343,094.98 during the same period. The administrators predicted that
the secured creditors, owed £112,400,000, would “experience a significant
shortfall following distribution.” 301 Unsecured creditors, owed
£906,086,000, would receive only the small minimum dividend that the
Enterprise Act requires administrators in certain situations to set aside for
them. 302
Pre-negotiated plans of Administration, however, do not appear to
have significantly reduced costs or increased creditor recoveries. In the pre(last visited Feb. 14, 2015).
294. BEGBIES TRAYNOR (CENTRAL) LLP, ASHPOL PLC: ADMINISTRATOR’S PROGRESS
REPORT para. 7 (2013) (on file with the author).
295. Id. at app. 2, para 1.11.
296. Id. at app. 1.
297. Id. at para. 5.
298. Id. at para. 5 & app. 1.
299. ERNST & YOUNG LLP, LUMINAR GROUP HOLDINGS: ADMINISTRATOR’S PROGRESS
REPORT 10 (2013) (on file with the author).
300. Id. at 9.
301. Id. at 12.
302. Id. This refers to the “Prescribed Part” established by the Enterprise Act. See
Enterprise Act, 2002, c. 40, § 252 (Eng.). Section 176A of the 1986 Insolvency Act
provides that:
(2) The liquidator, administrator or receiver — (a) shall make a prescribed part
of the company’s net property available for the satisfaction of unsecured[ ]
debts, and (b) shall not distribute that part to the proprietor of a floating charge
except in so far as it exceeds the amount[ ]required for the satisfaction of
unsecured debts.
Insolvency Act, 1986, ch. 45, § 176A (Eng.)
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negotiated sale of Hampson Industries, the aerospace and automotive
engineering company, administrators conducted a pre-negotiated sale of the
business when they took office on November 19, 2012.303 Secured
creditors recouped roughly 34 pence on the pound: they received
£27,331,143 on their claims of £74,800,000.304 They fared only moderately
better than secured creditors in the Section 363 asset sale of Chrysler,
whose low recoveries generated public controversy. 305 The administrators
of Hampson Industries, moreover, estimated “that there will be no funds
available to distribute to unsecured creditors.” 306 Nevertheless, the sale
cost £1,409,525 in professional fees, 307 and the administrators charged fees
of £359,079. 308 The bankruptcy estate paid a further £1,172 in expenses
and £11,094 in outside consulting costs, as well as additional legal fees.309
Reporting to comply with new regulations on prearranged Administrations
cost an additional £7,885. 310
In the pre-negotiated sale of the sports equipment company JJB
Sports, secured creditors received only £22,100,000 of their £58,400,000
claims, equivalent to 38 pence on the pound, while unsecured creditors
received only the small statutory minimum that Administration procedures
sometimes require. 311 Legal fees appear to have amounted to £408,129;
professional fees £12,033; fees to consultants to resolve insurance claims
£2,000; time costs £274,180; reporting costs £47,227; and advertising costs
£1,721. 312
Meanwhile, the return of secured creditor control, which appears not
to have significantly lowered costs, has occurred to the detriment of
unsecured creditors. 313 While compressing the time between entry into
Administration and its outcome may enable companies to continue to trade
without disruption to their suppliers, customers, and employees, and while
the proceeds of the sales have satisfied some debts of the businesses, the
concomitant lack of transparency has resulted in an absence of

303. FTI CONSULTING LLP, HAMPSON INDUSTRIES PLC: ADMINISTRATOR’S PROGRESS
REPORT 3-4 (2013) (on file with the author).
304. Id. at 7.
305. See supra Section II.C (discussing Chrysler’s section 363 asset sale).
306. FTI Consulting LLP, supra note 303, at 7.
307. Id. at app. B.
308. Id. at 7.
309. Id.
310. Id. at app. C.
311. KPMG LLP, JJB SPORTS PLC: ADMINISTRATOR’S PROGRESS REPORT 4, 11 (2013)
(on file with the author).
312. Id.
313. See supra text accompanying notes 294-312; see also infra text accompanying
notes 314-317.
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accountability. 314 Secured creditors have excluded unsecured creditors
from negotiations, even as the Administration procedures have sought
explicitly to include them. 315 They have lost the opportunity to defend their
interests by considering and voting on proposals. 316 Without any market
testing of the prearranged sales, businesses may have been undersold. 317
Existing empirical data from a study by University of Nottingham law
professor Sandra Frisby indicates the extent to which secured creditors
have benefitted at the expense of others.318 According to the data Frisby
collected, secured creditors recouped on average sixty-eight percent of their
total claims in pre-negotiated sales, while unsecured creditors recouped on
average 2.9 percent. 319 Secured creditors fared better in the pre-negotiated
setting than in a typical Administration, while unsecured creditors fared
worse. 320 Cost savings from the speed of negotiated sales, however, may
have contributed to job preservation. 321 Every company employee lost his
position in only four percent of pre-negotiated sales, compared with
twenty-two percent of traditional business sales. 322
Concern over abuses has prompted nonbinding codes of good conduct,
but compliance with them has appeared low. 323 In response to secured
creditors pre-negotiating sales, the committee of regulatory bodies for
insolvency practitioners issued Statement of Insolvency Practice 16 (“SIP
16”). 324 SIP 16 directs insolvency practitioners to “bear in mind” that they
have duties to creditors as a group. 325 To increase transparency, the
statement advises administrators to provide notice to creditors if assets will
be sold to a connected party without any public marketing. 326 It also
suggests that they should file explanations of why pre-negotiated sales have
314. Crawford, supra note 238, at 117.
315. Id.
316. Id. at 117-18; see also Armour, supra note 279, at 60-64; Re Kayley Vending Ltd.
[2009] EWHC 904 (Ch), [11].
317. Companies are frequently sold to connected parties. See, e.g., Armour, supra note
279, at 44.
318. Frisby, supra note 281, at 143-190.
319. Id. at 183-84.
320. Id.
321. Id. at 185-87.
322. Id. at 186.
323. See, e.g., Nadia Saleh & Edward Smith, Pre-packs Repacked?, 26 J. INT’L
BANKING L. & REG. 620 (2011) (suggesting that the nonbinding codes of good conduct did
not have the affect they should).
324. THE INSTITUTE OF CHARTERED ACCOUNTANTS IN ENGLAND AND WALES, STATEMENT
OF INSOLVENCY PRACTICE 16: PRE-PACKAGED SALES IN ADMINISTRATION, 2009, ¶9 (U.K.)
[hereinafter SIP 16] (creating a list of disclosure requirements in a pre-packaged sale);
Armour, supra note 279, at 64-66 (summarizing the information required by SIP 16).
325. SIP 16, supra note 324, ¶ 2.
326. Id. ¶ 9.
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taken place and confirm that sale prices were appropriate.327
In May 2012, the Insolvency Service, the executive agency that
regulates the English insolvency profession, reported that thirty-two
percent of cases it reviewed during 2009 did not conform with SIP 16, and
seven percent substantially violated it.328 Only six insolvency practitioners,
however, have received fines for breach of SIP 16, which ranged from
£250 to £2500. 329
V.

RETOOLING

The U.S. and U.K. both evidence how the benefits to secured creditors
from racing to claim assets strain the bankruptcy laws.330 Dominant
secured creditors in both countries appear unwilling to fund prolonged
periods of negotiation and instead act to collect their collateral as quickly
as they can. 331 Doing so has produced distributional effects and destroyed
the “going concern” value of companies in some instances. 332 If current
bankruptcy law is insufficient to protect the collective interest, and secured
creditors can easily circumvent the negotiated process that the laws are
intended to impose, do other avenues exist for alleviating the pressure to
revert to the creditors’ race?
This section explores the possibility for additional measures to
constrain or alter the incentives of secured creditors. If bankruptcy law is
to provide a forum in which similarly situated creditors receive equal
treatment and the recoveries of all creditors are maximized, then serious
retooling has become necessary. What would persuade secured creditors to
abandon a race for assets and rejoin the collective? What would make
them share assets with other creditors in a cooperative process, cognizant
of issues of overall efficiency and fairness?

327. See, e.g., Sandra Frisby, Balancing Interests in Administration: Contributions from
the Court and the Coalface, 24 J. INT’L BANKING & COMM’L L. 198, 199 (2009)
(highlighting that sale prices are appropriate because in pre-negotiated sales even though
there are independent interests at work).
328. BUSINESS, INNOVATION AND SKILLS COMMITTEE, THE INSOLVENCY SERVICE: SIXTH
REPORT OF SESSION 2012-13, H.C. 675, at 25 (U.K.).
329. Id. (noting that “[s]ince January 2010 there have been a total of 6 fines given to
insolvency practitioners . . . . rangin[g] from £250 to £2500 . . .”).
330. See supra Sections II.B, III.B, IV.C.
331. See supra Sections II.B, IV.C.
332. See supra Sections III.B, IV.C.
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A. English Example
Secured creditors in the U.S. are not using the traditional Chapter 11
rules. 333 They have grown reluctant to fund prolonged reorganizations that
will likely provide them with little direct benefit.334 The UK has offered a
less rule-based system, but its high costs have encouraged secured creditors
to short circuit the expense of its protections on minority interests and
recoup more value for themselves. 335 An earlier English process,
characterized by even fewer rules, however, suggests the possibility for
secured creditors to cooperate with others and work again towards
corporate rescue in appropriate cases. Empowering an impartial regulator
to persuade secured creditors to act in the collective interest may provide a
key element to accomplishing that aim. 336
Funding pressures make speed valuable. 337 In both the U.S. and the
U.K., cost appears in part to have driven secured creditors to deviate from
A significant challenge,
conventional reorganization procedures. 338
therefore, is to devise methods that accelerate traditional processes yet still
retain protections on other creditors. It has become necessary to identify
cheaper, faster mechanisms that nonetheless distribute assets equitably and
encourage the possibility of rescue.
With American courts and English regulators declining to restrain
secured creditors, influencing the incentives of secured creditors through
soft law appears necessary. 339 Doing so seems more realistic than
alternative measures to reduce the cost of reorganization, introduce new
ways of funding it, or reverse the special legal treatment of secured
credit. 340
In this light, an English example becomes instructive not for its exact
procedures but for demonstrating the possibility of altering the behavior of
secured creditors. For a brief period in the UK, secured creditors
333. See, e.g., Brege, supra note 154, at 1640 (discussing Chapter 11 loopholes).
334. See supra Section II.B.
335. See supra Section IV.C.
336. See infra Section V.B.
337. See supra Sections III.A, IV.C.
338. See, e.g., Mankovetskiy, supra note 5 (finding that the common desire to increase
returns and accelerate the process has resulted in fewer traditional reorganizations); supra
Sections III.A, IV.C.
339. See Sections II.B, IV.C; LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 57, at 13 (explaining how
courts have a preference for sale over reorganization).
340. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird, The Reorganization of Closely Held Firms and the
‘Opt Out’ Problem, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 913 (1994) (introducing different methods of
funding); Daniel S. Mozes, The Debtor is Dead, Long Live the Debtor, 85 TEMP. L. REV.
723, 724 (2013) (explaining why changes to the Code would fail); Skeel, supra note 60, at
940 (considering alternative measures).
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cooperated with other creditors to maximize collective recoveries and
facilitate opportunities for corporate rescue.341 In the 1980s, the Bank of
England developed informal principles with which secured creditors,
primarily banks, voluntarily complied. 342 The process gained popularity
and came to be known as the London Approach. 343
The London Approach bore similarities to non-bankruptcy workouts
in the U.S., but entailed more leadership by secured creditors and greater
inclusion of other creditors. 344 Banks, quick to notice that a company had
become distressed, forged agreements with other lenders.345 Together, they
allowed the company a break from paying its debts as they fell due and
continued to maintain existing lines of credit. 346 An informal committee of
creditors, meanwhile, restructured the debts of the company, so that it
could attract new financing. 347 The creditors shared equal decision making
power and divided among themselves the gains and losses that resulted. 348
The simple framework of the London Approach appeared to align the
interests of secured creditors with a collective bankruptcy process. The
banks assumed control of the companies.349 The creditors then worked
together to determine their economic viability and how best to restructure
them. 350 The cooperation achieved success in reorganizing companies in
the collective interest.351
341. See, e.g., Nevins, supra note 251, at *1.
342. See, e.g., FINCH, supra note 226, at 219-29 (outlining the history of the “London
Approach”).
343. Id.
344. See text accompanying notes 345-348.
345. See, e.g., Christoph Paulus, Some Thoughts on an Insolvency Procedure for
Countries, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 531, 538 (2002) (discussing the steps in the “London
Approach”).
346. See, e.g., Nevins, supra note 251, at *1 (2010) (discussing the process of
maintaining lines of credit).
347. See, e.g., Ruth Lane Neyens, Principles of Corporate Restructuring and Asset
Resolution, 8 L. & BUS. REV. AM. 371, 381-82 (2002) (examining the process of
restructuring in the “London Approach”).
348. John Armour & Simon Deakin, Norms in Private Insolvency Procedures: The
‘London Approach’ to the Resolution of Financial Distress 19 , (University of Cambridge
Centre for Business Research, Working Paper No. 173, 2000), available at
http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/pdf/WP173.pdf (discussing how banks share the benefits
avoiding insolvency and restructuring).
349. John Armour and Brian Cheffins, Corporate Ownership Structure and the
Evolution of Bankruptcy Law in the U.S. and UK 55 (University of Cambridge Centre for
Business Research, Working Paper No. 226, 2002).
350. See MANAGING FINANCIAL AND CORPORATE DISTRESS: LESSONS FROM ASIA 303
(Charles F. Adams, Robert E. Litan & Michael Pomerleano, eds. 2000) (describing the main
features of the London Approach).
351. See CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING: LESSONS FROM EXPERIENCE 64-65 (Michael
Pomerleano & William Shaw, eds. 2005) (describing the voluntary nature of the London
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Ultimately, changes in the credit markets resulted in increased holdout
and made reorganization through the London Approach more difficult.352
New institutional investors increased the numbers of creditors involved,
while claims trading increased their fluidity. 353 As the interests of creditors
diverged, negotiation became more expensive, slow, and difficult, just as
Chapter 11 and Administration proceedings have recently become. 354 With
less repeat interactions, creditors had less reason to make concessions in
one negotiation to attain benefits in future negotiations. 355
The past period in the United Kingdom nevertheless makes clear the
ability to harness support for collective processes from secured creditors.356
How might secured creditors be made to experience the upsides of
reorganization and rescue and the downsides of a race for assets? A simple
means for tying the incentives of secured creditors to traditional collective
procedures may provide a possible solution.
B. Impartial Regulator
Engagement by the regulator, the Bank of England, appears to have
encouraged the participation of secured creditors in the London Approach.
The Bank facilitated negotiations with creditors and persuaded them to
adopt a long-term view. 357 It convened the creditors and outside financial
advisors and intervened to broker compromises as disagreements arose.358
It did not contribute public funds.359
A study by the World Bank has highlighted the importance of “a
higher authority that can push cases to resolution and arbitrate disputes.”360
According to the World Bank, “the Bank of England was trusted because it
was considered impartial, independent and confidential.”361
None of the U.S. bankruptcy procedures offers similar involvement by

Approach and its emphasis on cooperation).
352. See FINCH, supra note 226, at 224-25 (2002) (explaining how the London
Approach has been affected by modern changes to the credit market).
353. Id.
354. Id.
355. Id.
356. See CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING: LESSONS FROM EXPERIENCE, supra note 351, at
64 (describing the success of the London Approach in encouraging creditors to cooperate in
efforts aimed at restructuring).
357. MANAGING FINANCIAL AND CORPORATE DISTRESS, supra note 350, at 302.
358. See FINCH, supra note 226, at 220 (describing the role of the Bank of England in
facilitating the London Approach).
359. CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING: LESSONS FROM EXPERIENCE, supra note 351, at 62
360. Id. at 61.
361. Id. at 62.
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an impartial third party, beyond the bankruptcy judge. 362 Although a
governmental body monitors the bankruptcy process, it has acted more as
an enforcer than a supervisor. The Office of the U.S. Trustee files civil
enforcement actions to protect the integrity of the bankruptcy system and
refers suspected bankruptcy crimes to the U.S. Attorneys. 363 The Office
reviews professional fee requests, appoints Chapter 11 trustees and
examiners, appoints unsecured creditors’ committees, and reviews
executive bonuses. 364
It has become crucial to determine whether such an entity, using only
soft law, could influence secured creditors to fund and participate in
reorganization rather than race to cash out their claims. 365 The significance
of the issue for creditors and for the economy demands rigorous study. The
London Approach indicates the possibility of inducing secured creditors to
rejoin a negotiated process that would provide collective benefits.
CONCLUSION
Secured creditors in the United States have avoided the rules of
Chapter 11, to the detriment of other creditors. 366 They have forced
companies into Section 363 asset sales in order to quickly recover their
collateral. 367 Doing so has eliminated the protections on unsecured
creditors that Chapter 11 has provided and reduced overall returns.368
English Administration would appear to have suggested the elements
of a solution. 369 The Administration procedures bear similarities to Section
363 asset sales, while retaining protections on other creditors.370
Nevertheless, secured creditors in England have also attempted to evade the
362. See text accompanying notes 363-364.
363. See The United States Trustee Program, THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE (Mar. 6, 2014, 8:48 AM), http://www.justice.gov/ust/eo/ust_org/index.htm
(explaining the role of the United States Trustee Program in bankruptcy proceedings).
364. Id.
365. Cf. Mark J. Roe & Federico Cenzi Venezze, A Capital Market, Corporate Law
Approach to Creditor Conduct, 112 MICH. L. REV. 59, 84 (2013) (noting the conflict of
interest present for secure credit holders in managing reorganizations).
366. See supra Sections II.B, III.B (explaining how creditors use Section 363 to force
the sale of assets for themselves and leave nothing for other creditors).
367. See, e.g., Mankovetskiy, supra note 5, at 93, 94-95 (noting the creditor push behind
recent increases in quick asset sales and decreasing amounts of reorganizations).
368. See, e.g., George W. Kuney, Hijacking Chapter 11, 21 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 19,
26-28 (2004) (describing the methods used by secured creditors to take advantage of chapter
11 proceedings to realize financial gains for themselves at the expense of other creditors).
369. See supra Section IV.B (explaining how reforms to the English Administration
forced creditors into a more collaborative process).
370. See supra Section IV.B (describing how creditors can avoid the traditional
bankruptcy proceedings but cannot take priority over other creditors).
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collective process and raced to increase their own recoveries with no
participation from more junior creditors. 371
The pressure point in both countries appears to be financing
cooperative processes. In the United States, companies without unsecured
assets available to offer in exchange for new credit rely on super priority
for existing secured creditors to induce them to lend. 372 In the United
Kingdom, no special mechanism for funding a period of reorganizing exists
at all, and the procedural requirements of the reorganization process
envisioned are particularly expensive. 373
The negative overall effects, however, far outweigh the cost
reductions gained by undermining national bankruptcy laws. Studies
indicate that while professional fees decrease in Section 363 asset sales,
burdens fall on unsecured creditors, and their recoveries plummet. 374
Preliminary data from the United Kingdom suggests that renewed secured
creditor control has not lowered expenses or increased creditor
recoveries. 375
The purpose of bankruptcy law has been to impose collective
procedures on creditors. 376 Otherwise, creditors race to maximize their own
recoveries, leaving others with little or nothing. 377 Allocating assets to the
fastest, most sophisticated creditors depletes value from companies,
generating inefficiencies and waste. 378 In the face of these pressures, it is
necessary to reanimate the aims of the law by devising measures to realign
the interests of the strongest creditors with participating in collective
reorganization efforts.

371. See supra Section IV.C (explaining how secured creditors plan sales before the
companies enter Administration).
372. See supra Section II.A (describing how “priming liens” take priority over existing
security interests).
373. See supra Section IV.C (outlining the costs of professional, legal, time, reporting
and advertising costs).
374. See supra Section III (explaining how the length of the proceeding raises
professional fees and how much longer traditional proceedings compared to Section 363
proceedings).
375. See supra Section IV.C (reporting data on professional fee totals).
376. See supra Section I (describing the goals and benefits of collective procedures).
377. See supra Section I (explaining how an absence of collective procedures incentives
an individual race to collect before other creditors).
378. See supra Section I (explaining how the assets might be more valuable as a whole
rather than sold off separately).
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